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Why Neighbors Kill

An Overview

Richard A. Vernon and Victoria M. Esses

In *Humanity: A Moral History of the Twentieth Century*, the moral philosopher Jonathan Glover asks what it is that makes acts of great inhumanity possible (Glover, 2001). Glover is (mercifully) sparing in his use of examples, given the huge array of examples that the twentieth century provides; but even his exemplary list evokes a horrified demand for explanation. What makes people commit such cruelties to one another? In two ways, his book also gives some ground for optimism. First, it shows convincingly that the way to cruelty has to be prepared before it opens. Soldiers have to be systematically desensitized before they can kill; victims have to be dehumanized before they can be killed (or else killed from so great a distance that their humanity need not be confronted); great cruelties have to be approached, step by step, by a series of smaller ones, as though a natural resistance has to be overcome. Second, Glover's book demonstrates the "moral resources" that stand in the way of acting cruelly: memorably, it records the story of the Afrikaner policeman who found that he could not beat a demonstrator to whom he had just acted politely (he had returned her lost shoe to her), and George Orwell's famous anecdote, from the Spanish Civil War, about his inability to shoot a half-dressed Fascist soldier who was in the human predicament of holding up his beltless trousers (pp. 37–8, 53).

Among the "moral resources" that should stand in the way of brutality, it is natural to think, neighborliness should rank highly. It is a sad but fairly unsurprising fact that, given the right conditions, humans are capable of discounting the suffering of strangers. It is both a sad *and* a surprising fact that humans are capable of discounting the

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suffering of those whom they know well *and* of directly inflicting the cruellest forms of suffering upon them. But the evidence for it is clear. In their work on rescuers, both Monroe (1996) and Geras (1995) have shown that neighborly ties have only rarely motivated people to risk their lives to save victims of genocide: For the most part, rescuers gave as their reason a primitive sense of shared humanity, not any special connection arising from local or neighborly ties. On the other hand, “an inestimably large number of people . . . did not help friends, neighbours and other acquaintances” (Geras, 1995, p. 35). When we turn from rescue and abandonment to actual perpetration, the evidence also tells against neighborliness. In both the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the 1990s, to mention but the two best-known cases, victims were killed – brutally – by people on first-name terms with them: who had broken bread with them, had chatted at the bus stop with them, had babysat their children, had married into their families, and for whom they had performed acts of personal kindness. “Doctors [in Rwanda] killed their patients, and schoolteachers killed their pupils” (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 115).

Of course, we need to know what *kind* of “neighborhood” preceded the killing, as chapter 4 in this volume, by Hewstone et al., importantly reminds us. It may not have been a very neighborly neighborhood, perhaps. If, as a Bosnian Croat reported, “we lived in peace and harmony . . . because every hundred metres we had a policeman to make sure we loved one another,” then we would hardly expect neighborhood (in the sense of mere locality) to provide a moral resource. In a case of that kind, neighborliness would be a fiction that papered over deep preexisting hostilities, without which there would have been no need of “love police.” Moreover, in the Holocaust rescue cases and in the Rwandan case, we know that neighborliness was undercut by a particularly virulent ideology that was transmitted by all the resources of state power and reinforced by social pressure, or indeed by direct coercion. Thus, it is not implausible to suppose that neighborliness *is*, as intuition suggests, a “moral resource” that inhibits brutality, though we need to think about when it does and when it does not.

The chapters in this volume repeatedly point, as Glover’s book does, to the events and processes that can eat away at inhibitions and make the apparently unthinkable happen. None of them attribute magical potency to neighborhood, but they do assume “why neighbors kill” to be a more pressing question than “why *don’t* neighbors kill?”, a question that would be premised on very deep misanthropy indeed. The chapters reflect several different disciplinary perspectives; they work at different levels of generality; and they concern different real-world

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cases. As a result, it is not surprising that their findings differ, though their differences are generally of a complementary rather a contradictory kind. As with other studies of intergroup conflict, this volume will offer the conclusion that “no single factor or set of factors can explain everything” (Brown, 1997, p. 24), and that understanding will be based on a sense of the way in which different kinds and levels of explanations interact with one another.

The chapters in Part I of this work direct our attention to the importance of factors at the level of the individual agent. In chapter 2, Hafer, Olson, and Peterson open the discussion with an account of the social psychology of justice, a field that enquires into “the conditions under which justice is seen as an important consideration in one’s interactions with others; how people judge what is fair and unfair (or just and unjust); and how people respond to injustice once it is perceived” (p. xx). Focusing upon individual-level variables, the authors distinguish between three scenarios. In the first, which very clearly addresses the theme of “devaluation” that frequently recurs in these chapters, certain groups are simply excluded from what the agent takes to be the scope of justice; these groups simply do not count, and so the field is left open to the operation of other motives, such as self-interest. Groups may be excluded because they are perceived as different, distant, perhaps not “human,” because they pose a threat; or because they are useless to the agent. In the second scenario, justice is operative, but weak, and what it calls for is outweighed by competing considerations, directly self-interested or otherwise. In the third scenario, justice applies, and with full force, but what it calls for is the infliction of harm. In this context, it becomes particularly important to examine what factors influence determinations of a group’s deservingness of punishment or reprisal. Those determinations may arise from actions taken or believed to have been taken, from the perceived character of the group’s members, or simply from whether members of the group are *liked*. Even when there are more-or-less agreed background principles of fairness or justice, then, many subjective elements will enter into decisions about whether and how they apply: “What may be especially difficult as an outsider is to entertain the notion that some atrocities might not be seen as unfair, and may even be seen as absolutely necessary for justice to prevail” (p. xx). When the latter applies, of course, we confront a much more overt phenomenon than the more furtive or unconscious operations of *schadenfreude* or prejudice discussed in later chapters, although some of the same variables (devaluation, difference, distance) may be involved.

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In chapter 3, Dovidio, Pearson, Gaertner, and Hodson discuss mild racial bias or what they term “everyday” prejudice. Within the past half-century outright racial bigotry has declined in western societies; however, Dovidio et al. demonstrate that extreme and overt prejudice of that kind is not necessary to produce support for harmful or even fatal damage to other racial groups. Many people who forthrightly condemn bigotry nevertheless have negative feelings towards racial minorities, feelings that may be given no expression in normal contexts of behavior, and that may be unperceived even by the agents themselves. Certain circumstances, however, make them consequential. For example, when negative judgments about a member of a racial minority can be justified by other criteria, aversion comes to the fore. Aversion may be “disinhibited” by perceived provocations, by anonymity, by peer pressure or the contagious effects of collective action. The effects are also evident, the authors show, in the interpretation of evidence and in sentencing decisions in the legal process. Employing an explanatory model of hatred that comprises three variables – denial of intimacy, passion (anger and/or fear), and devaluation of the other – the authors show that even low levels of negative disposition may cross the line into aggression. Levels of negativity that are quite consistent with normal neighborliness, then, are also consistent, given the right disinhibiting conditions, with support for destructive actions. As a result, legislation that delegitimizes and punishes outright bigotry will not reach some important causes of racial hostility and violence.

Most of the chapters in this volume refer in part to the question of what can restrain mass violence, if only by implication. However, the chapter by Hewstone et al. places the question of restraint at the forefront, asking what it is that neutralizes expected restraints or renders them inoperative. Its focus is on the well-known “contact hypothesis” (Allport, 1954), which concerns the restraining effects of previous contact between a group of potential perpetrators and a group of potential victims. When certain conditions have been met, it is hypothesized, prior contact among members of groups will inhibit subsequent violence between them. At least on the face of the matter, the stunning twentieth-century examples of neighborly murder in Poland, Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and elsewhere would seem to put paid fatally to that hypothesis. Hewstone et al. suggest a much more nuanced conclusion. For one thing, as already noted briefly above, we need to know much more about the kind and extent of intergroup contact. Mere proximity may mean nothing at all (and may even have negative effects when “the other” is nearby in worrying numbers). Coexistence, even over a long period, may be a poor predictor of future peace if

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it accompanies a “psychological wall” of buried, unavowed distrust. Inter-marriage may mean little if rates are low (and if inter-marriage fails to win full social acceptance). Gross statistics may conceal crucial differences of very local kinds, which would need to be correlated precisely with rates of participation in or resistance to genocidal action. For another thing, even if prior intergroup contact (of any kind) has positive effects, it is entirely unreasonable to expect these to survive countervailing influences, ingroup pressure, massive propaganda, and threats to punish nonparticipation in mass violence. “Placed in some of the situations that perpetrators found themselves in, we doubt whether any of us could have resisted such extreme pressure” (p. xx). There are, then, many unknowns. But Hewstone et al. conclude their chapter by suggesting that “actual, face-to-face” contact among members of potentially hostile groups is at least a necessary condition for potential hostility to be prevented from becoming actual.

In the final chapter in this section, Spears and Leach address a psychological trope known as *schadenfreude*, a German word pressed into service because English lacks a convenient term for taking pleasure in the misfortune of others. The chapter concerns *schadenfreude* in its group-based rather than its individual form. Spears and Leach are modest in their claims about its significance. *Schadenfreude* does not, they claim, directly propel people to mass violence; it is a passive and opportunistic reaction rather than an action-guiding motive, as Nietzsche classically pointed out. However, it may nevertheless enter into the explanation of mass violence in several important ways. It may help to explain the inaction of bystanders, in whom the alternative reaction of sympathy may be blocked by taking pleasure in the suffering of certain groups, groups that may well include neighbors, whose proximity facilitates comparison and thus amplifies the likelihood of resentment. Spears and Leach helpfully point out that it is implausible to take bystanders’ inaction as a sort of default position, in need of no explanation: It requires explaining just as the perpetrators’ actions do, and *schadenfreude* is one of the mechanisms that make it more intelligible. *Schadenfreude* may be part of a context of socially sustained beliefs that foster intergroup conflicts, especially, perhaps, if its widespread acceptance tends to neutralize norms that generally forbid the expression of malice. Its presence may signal to perpetrators that their actions will likely be overlooked or furtively approved. Finally, because the pleasure of *schadenfreude* is apparently enhanced when one also benefits from the target group’s misfortune, the emotion may easily ally itself with the motive of material interest, when, for example, the target group stands to lose land or property or other

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transferable assets. This chapter, like that of Dovidio et al., is particularly useful in showing how familiar and unsurprising emotions, accepted in the context of ordinary life, may nevertheless be steps toward gross violence. Schadenfreude, Spears and Leach show, is more or less rife in sporting contexts. One might add that some theorists, notably Hobbes (1968), propose that it is the basis of all humor. Banal though it is, then, it may nevertheless be “a brick in the bridge,” as the authors put it.

The chapters in Part II of this book move the focus to societal factors. In chapter 6, Glick takes up the scapegoating phenomenon that is near-universal in explanations of group-based violence; he rejects the view from Freudian psychology that scapegoating is a projective device in which agents with weak personalities displace upon others the features that they reject in themselves (an explanation adopted in Adelman’s chapter below). Instead, Glick argues, we should adopt a cognitive view of the phenomenon: It is a kind of derailing of normal processes of attribution through which agents try to make sense of the world. Blame, after all, is *for* something, and so the starting point is an attempt to assign responsibility for some negative event. Here Glick refers to Staub’s category (see chapter 11) of changes in “life conditions,” such as economic depression or social dislocation. Assigning responsibility for such things is often inherently difficult, for causation is complex; as a result, it is often preformed by conveniently preexisting stereotypes and it is skewed by the fact that some explanations are more flattering to the interpreter than others. That said, Glick suggests that scapegoating is an attempt to *explain* otherwise puzzling events in the world. The scapegoat role tends to fall to groups that fit the explanatory attempt because they are perceived to have the capacity to bring about the negative events, and are open to suspicion because they are perceived as cold or distant. Chua’s recently popular book, *World on Fire* (2003), provides rich anecdotal confirmation of Glick’s hypothesis. Merchant niche groups (as they may be termed) – South Asian, Jewish, Armenian, and Chinese minorities that retain their distinct identity – tend to be blamed for the dislocations resulting from structural adjustment policies induced by the International Monetary Fund. Drawing first upon the phenomenon of witchcraft persecutions in early modern Europe, Glick goes on to detail the ways in which Jews, Armenians, and Tutsi fitted the profile that attracts scapegoating, and thus enabled German, Turkish, and Hutu persecutors to see themselves as victims of the powerful groups that they themselves persecuted. That *we*, the perpetrators, are the real victims is of course a belief that confers a license for virtually unlimited abuse. Glick goes on to argue that his proposed model,

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unlike the personality-based model, can explain why breakdowns can be sudden, why long periods of coexistence may break down, why old and apparently archaic enmities can rekindle, and why neighbors (as opposed to distant enemies) are often convenient vehicles for blame.

Chapters 7 and 8 also move emphatically, though in different ways, away from the individual context to political ones. Bar-Tal and Sharvit draw our attention to the role of a political dynamic that they term “the transitional context.” To a degree, this notion echoes the importance, alluded to in other chapters, of situational factors and processes that can lead to interethnic conflict, though the depiction of variables here is on a larger scale. A transitional context, according to the authors, “consists of the physical, social, political, economic, military, and psychological conditions, temporary in their nature, that make up the environment in which individuals and collectives function” (p. xx). Within this context, they distinguish between “major societal events” and “major societal information,” the former being events that resonate with meaning and dominate the public agenda, the latter being “information supplied by an epistemic authority” that “affects the psychological conditions of the society by influencing society members’ thoughts and feelings about their reality” (p. xx). Drawing upon the reactions of Israeli Jews in the years after 2000, Bar-Tal and Sharvit examine three elements: the intensity of the transitional context (the strength of its impact on thoughts and feelings), its negativity (because the negativity of events is correlated with strength of response), and the effect of commonly held shared narratives on people’s responses. The events following the Al Aqsa Intifada, the chapter shows, evoked a “repertoire” of psychological responses – fear, delegitimization, a sense of victimhood, and a conviction that differences were irreconcilable – that led to widespread support for a violent response, for a forceful leader, and for a policy of physical separation of the Israeli and Palestinian populations. Because many of the same psychological processes were mirrored in the Palestinians’ experience, each group was led to behave in ways that reinforced the repertoire of expectations of the other, in a vicious informational cycle. Of particular importance, in relation to other chapters in this book, are the saliency of threats as motivators and the role of culturally enshrined narratives in delegitimizing the viewpoints of others and validating the justice of one’s own cause.

Marchak’s chapter is a forthright corrective to any notion that explanations of genocide or crime against humanity can proceed on a psychological or cultural level without reference to structural factors of a political kind. As its title indicates, the chapter challenges

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the premise of this book. Most victims of mass crime are killed not by neighbors but by states: Where neighbors do kill, as in Rwanda, or in Holocaust-related incidents mentioned in other chapters, they do so under the heavy influence of state-directed violence, sometimes, in fact, under direct state coercion. Thus, Marchak suggests that we should look to states' circumstances in order to determine causation. Reviewing nine cases from the Armenian genocide to Rwanda, Marchak establishes the importance of five preconditions: social change that is undermining the position of dominant groups, strong military (professional or militia) forces, weak civil society, substantial inequality (between ethnically defined groups or otherwise), and the existence of a material interest in eliminating or expelling potential victim groups. With the partial exception of Cambodia, where no material interest (as distinct from ideology) drove the leadership, all these preconditions can be identified in the cases that are analyzed, leading to Marchak's conclusion that the principal cause of mass violence is the state's role in maintaining dominant groups under conditions of threat and instability. Marchak is particularly concerned to induce skepticism about causal theories that emphasize ethnicity, for other kinds of group divisions may be equally or more important, Cambodia, of course, being the classic modern example. (In order to bring the case under the rubric of "genocide," the stretched term "autogenocide" is sometimes employed – rather like counting suicides in the murder rate on the grounds that they are "automurders"?) Moreover, the chapter suggests that where ethnicity, race, or religion do figure, they may be no more than rationalizations for power- or greed-based motives, which depressingly recur, to varying degrees, in the cases studied.

In Part III of this collection, Adelman, Esses and Jackson, and Staub offer some integrating perspectives. Adelman's chapter takes the explanatory level to a remarkable depth. We must, he says, take seriously the notion of *evil*. Dissenting from social science that tells us that there are only evil acts, not evil people, Adelman believes that we need to seek the origins of evil at the basic level of personality (or character) construction. He also suggests that acts of great cruelty arise from a progressive series of five stages in "altering the identity of the other": We move from defining a group as other, through defining it as less valuable than our own group, defining it as less than human, blaming it, and finally to "defining the other as a threat . . . *independent of [its] intent*" (p. xx) and thus as something that must be dealt with through elimination rather than attempts to change it. This "moral disengagement" from the human reality of the other is aided by social and institutional conditions (such as an authoritarian climate)

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that undermine the sense of individual responsibility and merge the agent with the group. Vital though these stages and conditions are to an explanation, they depend on something more profound, which Adelman describes eloquently and at length. Drawing on Hegel's idea of a (masculine) desire to become god-like, and thus to separate one's self from one's flesh, Adelman explores the model of a divided person who seeks to rid himself of irrational parts that he regrets by projecting them upon others. "Reason blames the flesh. The fundamental root of xenophobia is a phobia directed at one's own body and its appetites" (p. xx). On this basis, Adelman rejects the view that genocide results from a quest for wealth or power. Unlike such materialistic models, the proposed model explains why genocide is accompanied by the humiliation of the victims as well as their destruction – they are being ritually expunged – and why genocidal murder is so often accompanied by sexual violence: It springs from hatred of the body. After critically reviewing several alternative explanations of the Rwanda genocide, Adelman returns to his general model as an explanation of both the perpetrators' actions and the bystanders' inaction. "In all cases," he writes, "each agent and agency was permeated with what was perceived to be a profound and higher vision of the entity that did not include a responsibility towards the Other as a prime consideration" (p. xx). To overcome this alienating preoccupation with the integrity of our own mental constructs, we need to resurrect a concern with building characters that do not (abstractly) repel and expunge, but (concretely) care.

The chapter by Esses and Jackson, which follows, analyzes ethnic conflict and violence through their Unified Instrumental Model of Group Conflict (Esses, Jackson, Dovidio, & Hodson, 2005). Integrating work by a number of psychologists in the area, this model considers the joint role of socially prevalent ideologies and situational characteristics in eliciting ethnic antagonism. Esses and Jackson suggest that dominant ideologies, such as belief systems that promote group dominance and cultural worldviews that prescribe appropriate modes of thinking and behaving, and situational factors, such as instability and challenges to the status quo, may be mutually reinforcing and operate in concert to create and exacerbate perceptions of intergroup competition and tension. This competition, they suggest, may be real or only perceived, and may be over more tangible resources such as jobs and material possessions, or over more symbolic factors including religious and cultural dominance. Irrespective, according to the model, competition elicits a drive to remove the source of competition, so that interethnic violence may be seen as a manifestation of attempts

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to reduce competition by discrediting or obliterating the competitor outgroup. Using the example of the ongoing conflict between Arabs and Africans in Sudan, they provide compelling evidence for each of the stages of their model. At the same time, application of the model allows insight into heinous acts that might otherwise be considered “inexplicable.” Although they paint a grim picture of the human condition and the drive for power and dominance, their model also provides some potential for intervention or even prevention.

Staub’s chapter, which draws upon his extensive work on the origins and prevention of genocide, serves to bring together many of the general themes that recur in explaining neighborly violence. In Staub’s account, explanatory factors fall under two general headings: difficult social conditions, and culture. The sets of factors interpenetrate, however, for features of culture influence how groups respond to difficult social conditions, in constructive or destructive ways. “Difficult social conditions” include, but are not exhausted by, material deprivation. It is not – Staub’s and other contributors’ examples suggest – absolute deprivation, but a deterioration in conditions that is especially problematic. Under such conditions, direct material self-interest will come into play, but no less important are reactions stemming from insecurity, insecurity that may arise not only from material threats but also from political upheavals and dislocations resulting from wars. Destructive reactions to insecurity of all kinds may include scapegoating (a phenomenon examined in chapter 6) and devaluing of the other (a phenomenon examined in one form or another in most of the other chapters). The devaluing of some other group, its representation as something less than human, makes it all too easy for it to figure as an obstacle to the achievement of positive social visions, so that its elimination is called for as a matter of justice or general well-being or historical necessity. The progress from devaluing and blaming to destroying is of course aided when, as was the case in Rwanda and in Yugoslavia, the lines of group division are associated with past wounds, wounds that are not only unhealed but also, in some cases, actually treasured as tokens of group identity. The progress to genocide is also aided by a culture of authoritarianism, either in the society at large or in a powerful subgroup seeking dominance. Finally, the process, once under way, feeds itself (a confirmation of Glover’s central view). A further coarsening of standards takes place, the persecutors are themselves damaged by their own cruelty, and the reactions of the other may confirm the devaluation imposed upon them.

While the authors in this collection may wish in some cases to start the causal story at different points, they need not disagree about

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a list of elements of which most will likely find a place in a full explanatory picture. Somewhere in the causal environment we need to find a place for both chronic and short-term situational factors. Chronic factors may include an authoritarian political culture that dulls critical capacity and diminishes the sense of responsibility; the scarcity of some valued good; background memories of rivalry; and the resources to mobilize populations. Short-term situational factors include, notably, the fairly rapid emergence of threats to basic (economic and physical) security. Second, we need to find a place for the modalities described in detailed and various ways in this book. We may call them psychological modalities when they are apparently culturally invariant complexes of attitude, such as the scapegoating and schadenfreude phenomena, or the family of mental operations associated with various stages of devaluing the other. We may call them cultural modalities when they are sets of attitudes connected with specific group identity and memory, such as the sense of victimhood that Bar-Tal and Sharvit trace in the Israeli example, but which is also a notable feature of the Serbian and Afrikaner cases. Third, we need to enquire into why what would otherwise restrain perpetrators does not. The absence of internal restraint – of the connectedness to others that Adelman and others stress – will be explained by some combination of the two elements above. *Social* constraints include an independent civil society, mentioned in both Staub and Marchak's accounts, that denies perpetrators a monopoly of informational influence by making present a variety of sources of news and points of view. *External* constraints include, very importantly, the state: Whether we consult classical social contract theory or Weberian political sociology, it is the state that bears the role of suppressing violence among its citizens, and if neighbors kill neighbors that must mean at the very least that the state has failed, if not that it has become complicit in or the direct sponsor of violence. Why this is so, given that the security-promoting role of the state is so well understood and universally acknowledged in principle, must always be an indispensable question, though answers will necessarily differ from case to case. Bridging the divide between external and internal constraints is the question of the role of bystanders: From the standpoint of the perpetrators, they are external agents, while if we consider their own motivation, they may be subject to the same internal failings as the perpetrators themselves, that is, they may devalue or dehumanize the victims, exclude them from the scope of justice, suspect them of somehow deserving their fate, secretly applaud it, stand to profit from their loss, or for one reason or another wash their hands of personal responsibility.

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A list, of course, is not an explanatory model, and in fact this list is consistent with several different, and rival, explanatory models. If the drive to destroy is a universal (male) character flaw then other factors will figure essentially as releases or excuses rather than having independent causal force. If mass destruction is state-driven, then the psychological and cultural factors will be no more than links in a manipulated series. If material greed is a primary motive, the apparatus of scapegoating and conspiracy theories will amount only to rationalization. There is no reason to suppose that consensus can be reached in contested social-scientific questions such as this. Nor is there any reason to suppose that the most plausible model in any given case will apply across the board. Also, there is nothing wrong with multicausal models, if that is what the evidence calls for. But at the very least, a list can help to modify or qualify or test the adequacy of selected variables, by pressing the claims of alternative or prior or jointly necessary conditions, or by revealing the presence of overdetermination.

A list can also help with the question of remedies, for the place to begin remedying conflict is not necessarily the place where the causal chain begins. There may be nothing we can do about root causes, if there are root causes. Or even if we can do something about them, the subsequent process will have left its mark on both victims and perpetrators, and so we need to understand the intervening elements and phases too: Remedies may be path-dependent. Although the question of remedy is not a central focus of this collection, most of the chapters contribute to it valuably. Staub comments on the extensive remedial processes currently under way in Rwanda, stressing the need for mutual comprehension (even when there is no mutual agreement in narratives), and for concrete activities undertaken by the parties in common. Adelman stresses the need for moral thinking to return to issues of character of the kind discussed in "virtue ethics." Glick draws attention to the potential of latent stereotypes to activate when disaster calls for the assignment of blame, and hence to the importance of not ignoring them even when they are latent. Hafer et al. point to the importantly different remedies called for by exclusion from the scope of justice, on the one hand, and the (mistaken) belief in just punishment on the other. Hewstone et al. advocate the importance of a strong civil society (and are implicitly supported in this by Marchak). Dovidio et al. and Esses and Jackson point to the important role of identity, and specifically the possibility of an inclusive identity, as potentially reducing intergroup competition and conflict. In their different ways, these proposals all aim at the building or rebuilding

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of what Glover terms the “moral resources” that can draw agents back even when pressures for mass violence mount.

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