

Chapter One

Imperial Delhi

New Delhi was one of Britain's most spectacular showcases of imperial modernity. It was commissioned in 1911 to facilitate the transfer of the capital of British India from Calcutta to Delhi and took 20 years to construct. It embodied the rationality of imperialism in its aesthetics (refined, functional classicism), science (a healthy, ordered landscape) and politics (an authoritarian, hierarchical society). As a node within a global, imperial network of sights, New Delhi represented Britain's vision for an empire of legitimacy and longevity in the twentieth century.

The material reality of these utopic visions, however, did not prove acquiescent to imperial will. At the level of administration, bureaucracy and governance, Delhi's colonial landscape was as much dominated by the older city to the north of the imperial headquarters. This was *Shahjahanabad*, the walled city that had functioned as the capital of the Mughal Empire from 1648 to 1857. As against the neo-classical monumentalism of the imperial capital, and the sterile, geometric spaces of New Delhi, 'Old Delhi' was depicted as an organic space of tradition and community. Urban life here was conducted in congested and winding streets between communities defined by historic location and caste. Temporal flows were dictated by calls to prayer and a thriving annual schedule of Hindu, Sikh, Jain and Muslim festivals. Bereft of extensive modern sanitation and infrastructure, Old Delhi was a haptic and sensory place of smells, sights and contact that bewildered and beguiled Western tourists and governors alike.

This, at least, is the popular conception of the colonial geography of Delhi; of dual cities. This is embodied in the now iconic aerial photo of the dividing line between the two cities (see cover image). This book will explore the extent to which the two cities were, in fact, governed as one and impacted upon each other in myriad ways. As a closer inspection of the aerial photo shows, the *cordon sanitaire* between the two cities was, in fact, traversed by

multiple, well-worn tracks. Similarly, streets within the old city had been widened and cleared, whereas the plot of land within the walled city to the west had been demolished in the nineteenth century and was reconstructed in the 1920–30s. These spatial traces hint at the geographies of interaction and incursion between the two cities.

Rather than plotting an entire history of Delhi as the capital of the Raj (1911–47), three case studies will be used to explore the interactions between the cities. These will show that, in terms of residential accommodation, policing and infrastructural improvement, the two cities were intimately intertwined. While being very different projects, these landscapes of interconnection shared similar political rationalities of practice that must be explored. Likewise, each landscape presents evidence of a colonial government that sought security and profit for itself over the welfare and development of the Indian population, and thus demands some sort of critical commentary.

The writings of Michel Foucault provide a toolkit with which to explore the complementarity of these seemingly diverse practices of rule. The governmentalities that infused spaces of residence, policing and improvement allow an analysis that maintains their specificity but suggests continuities in the thought, vision, identity politics, technology and ethos that informed them. Secondly, the body of literature that has sought to extend Foucault's writings to the colonial context suggests a number of ways in which colonial governmentalities can be articulated to critique imperial rule at the level of the everyday and the material. Having outlined these two bodies of literature, we will return at the end of the chapter to Delhi to set the historiographical and historical–geographical context for this empirical exploration of Foucault's later works.

Security, Territory, Population

Governmental rationalities

Underwriting the majority of Foucault's works are his ruminations on the concept of power, which became more explicit in his later, genealogical writings. Whereas the earlier, archaeological works had always been about power to an extent (see Chapter 2), the genealogical works of Foucault's later career addressed power directly and with a distinct terminology, in relation to material, governmental, social and spatial formations. Foucault referred to 'domination' as a structure of force in which the subordinate have little, or no, space for manoeuvre (Hindess, 1996: 97). In opposition, 'power' referred to a structure of actions that bears on the decisions of free individuals, making power unstable and reversible. Between these two forces

lie the relations of ‘government’, the conduct of conduct that aims to regulate the behaviour of individuals and populations. Such power–knowledge relations are integrated in particular institutions, from the state to the family or a system of morality. As such, Deleuze (1988: 89) suggests that in each historical – and geographical – formation, we must ask what belongs to which institution, what power relations are integrated, what relations occur between institutions and how these divisions change from one stratum to the next (over time and space).

It is this fragmented and shifting vision of power that recurs throughout Foucault’s thought, if not in the writings about him or much of his earlier published material. He identified modern forms of power that constituted, circulated and normalised without the central coordination of an ultimate sovereign. As such, there is not just ‘power’; there are types of power relation that depend upon the forces, knowledges, archives and diagrams they relate for their characteristics. Yet, Foucault did refer to the types of power that emerged in the modern era as ‘biopower’; powers over life that targeted both the individual body, through techniques of discipline, and the social body, through government of the population (Foucault, 1979b). This governmental regulation was exerted through various domains that were posited as autonomous to the state. These included the economy, society and the population, that last of which was targeted through ‘biopolitics’.

These power relations cannot be neatly separated. Rather than successions or substitutions of power relations, there are changes of mode, moods and moments (Dillon, 2004: 41). Foucault rejected interpretations of his early work that stressed temporal discontinuity: he emphasised the difficulty of clean breaks (Foucault, 1970: 50, 1972: 175, 1980: 111), suggested that different rationalities ‘dovetailed’ together (Foucault, 1975–6 [2003]: 242) and later suggested that different forms of power entered into a form of triangulation, but that ‘government’ power attained a pre-eminence over sovereign and discipline power (Foucault, 1978 [2001]: 220).

These forms of power also retain complex relationships with their out-sides, seemingly excluding subjects from the political order, only to include them more completely in politics by their outcast state. Such relations include the figure cast beyond the protection of the sovereign’s law, the abnormal excluded from society through enclosure within disciplinary institutions or the uncivilised subject deemed incapable of liberal conduct.

Each chapter in this book will examine a particular landscape that was forged primarily through the forces of one particular type of power relation: the hierarchies of knowledge in New Delhi, disciplinary power and policing, and the biopolitics of urban improvement. These types of power relation will be addressed in detail in each chapter. Yet, throughout these forms of power, the persistent effects of sovereign power were felt. To foreshadow its consideration in the following chapters, sovereign power in the context of

biopower will now be explained, in advance of a discussion of the translations of biopower to the colonial context.

Sovereign power

Sovereignty is an intensely territorial concept. From an original association with pre-modern empires, it came to refer to the post-Westphalian (1648) system of states within which there was one absolute authority who could legitimately exercise violence (Taylor, 2000, although see Elden, 2005 for a discussion of the complexity of the Treaty of Westphalia). International diplomatic relations determined that no state would intervene in the domestic politics of another without invitation, as the basis of mutual recognition of sovereignty. Within a territory, sovereignty could be exercised by the monarch or succeeding bureaucracies. Yet these superior powers, depended upon the consent of their subjects, which they offered up in return for certain rights and protections (Hindess, 1996: 12).

Foucault (1975–6 [2003]: 23–42) argued that this predominant institutional role of the sovereign had cast a juridical shadow over considerations of power relations in the post-medieval period. Juridical power attempts to prevent a type of action through the threat of legal or social sanctions and, as such, was still pitched as a concept that could be owned or possessed by the head of a hierarchy of rights and consent (Tadros, 1998: 78). This disregarded the new disciplinary mechanisms of power that had emerged (see Chapter 3 for a discussion of sovereignty, law and discipline). Foucault (1975–6 [2003]: 241) posed the sovereign as the body that only exercised its power over life when it extracted people, resources and taxes, or made a decision about killing; it had the right to take life or let live. Foucault encouraged us to look for power beyond the centre, beyond the realm of conscious decisions, as something that circulates and is not owned, and to begin our analyses with infinitesimal mechanisms, material operations and forms of subjection (Foucault, 1975–6 [2003]: 34). This would reflect the evolution of power relations towards an intrusive and self-formative biopower; a power over life itself.

Foucault's suggestions have been read by many as a call to abandon analyses of sovereign power in favour of endlessly circulating, anonymous forms of normalisation. Yet others have shown how the paradox of sovereignty continues to play itself out within the framework of contemporary biopower (Connolly, 2004). The paradox refers to societies in which the rule of law is enabled and secured by a sovereign that is above the law itself. Drawing upon yet challenging Foucault, Agamben (1998) has insisted that the sovereign has *always* been concerned with biopolitics, and that sovereign power retains the right to decide on a state of exception. Thereby individuals or groups are proclaimed to be beyond the protection of the sovereign's laws, and are thus

exposed, as ‘bare life’, to violence without protection. Agamben has done a huge amount to reinsert considerations of violence and sovereignty into theoretical debates, yet his suggestion that exceptionalism and the (concentration) camp mark the *nomos* (the principles governing human conduct) of modernity surely presents an over-simplified and nihilistic approach to power relations. We can counter this simplification by continuing to address sovereign power in terms of resistance, complexity, its geographies and its varied imbrications with biopower.

First, an exceptionalist view of sovereign power provides little consideration of the possibility of *resistance*. Foucault (1975–6 [2003]) suggested that such resistance could occur at the level of counter-discourses that challenge views of society predicated on sovereign understandings of power, stressing society as a place of continuing war and bare life, not just peace and political life (see Neal, 2004). At a more embodied level, Edkins and Pin-Fat (2004) have suggested that resistance to sovereign power would target the attempt to divide life and the following production of bare life. The refusal of distinctions would challenge the act of counting and classifying, yet resisting bare life would mean accepting this status in an attempt to highlight the violent operation of sovereign power, as mobilised in non-violent non-cooperation. However, these considerations of resistance are constrained by an overly prescriptive understanding of sovereignty that reduces it to the power of exception.

Agamben empties sovereignty of much of the *complexity* of its practice and principles and reinstates a central model of power, over-emphasising the decision of the sovereign at the cost of the multiplicity of force relations operating in society (Neal, 2004: 375). The sovereign idiom of power conceals itself within capillaries of power and knowledge production. While sovereignty exposes itself in violence and terror, it can also be productive and generous in multiple, provisional and always contested ways (Hansen, 2005: 172). Starting with the writings of Jean Bodin from 1576, de Benoist (1999) has charted the variety of different forms of sovereignty. From an original basis in the ability to legislate, these forms have evolved through absolutist, revolutionary, nationalist, liberal and totalitarian regimes. Hansen and Stepputat (2005: 7) also used Bodin to sketch the non-exceptionalist characteristics of sovereign power that, besides the rights of law and war making, included office appointment, fiscal validation, taxation, language and land rights. In his book entitled *State of Exception*, Agamben (2005: 23) sought to stress the complex topographies of these exceptional spaces, but he operates within the definitions of the juridical order, not the actions these orders initiate in material or social space.

Sovereignty is a result of these actions, an ontological effect made real by ritualistic and performative evocations of power. Sovereign rights have been democratised such that citizens can now effectively wield them, although

this also works to reinforce the adjudicator of these rights, which is often the sovereign power itself. Although still dependent on the ultimate ability of the sovereign to wield violence, this creates a much more fragile view of state sovereignty:

sovereignty of the state is an aspiration that seeks to create itself in the face of internally fragmented, unevenly distributed and unpredictable configurations of political authority that exercise more or less legitimate violence in a territory. (Hansen and Stepputat, 2005: 3)

This more complex and fragmented view of sovereignty forces a discussion of its *geography* that is foreclosed by Agamben's insistence that the essence of sovereignty is the decision regarding exceptions. Walker (2004) has argued that this ignores the time-space specificities of sovereignty, reproducing Schmitt's absolute spatialities in which exceptions are fixed on passive space. Rather, sovereignty is spatiotemporally specific in its practices and complex sites (see Gregory, 2007). The topology of sovereignty is, thus, not a space, but a dividing practice that seeks to impose authority, the law, and often violence (Dillon, 2004: 56).

Hansen's and Stepputat's logical progression from their interpretation of sovereignty was to seek out its historical specificity in particular territories. This involves studying historically embedded practices and cultural meanings of sovereign practice and violence, whether the latter is actual or borne in rumours and myth. Yet, to grasp these complex sovereignties means to fathom them in their articulation with modern forms of biopower. Although Foucault did argue forcefully for moving conceptions of power away from the sovereign, in his writings on discipline and sovereign power, he stressed their coming together (Foucault, 1975–6 [2003]: 39). As Dillon (2004: 45) has suggested, sovereignty co-evolves around the 'terrains of existence' of biopolitics and discipline, crafting itself around different grids of intelligibility.

The *imbrications* of sovereign- and bio-powers are gaining increasing attention. Hansen and Stepputat (2005: 9) have examined how the democratisation of sovereign rights and the creation of national citizenries were accompanied by the emergence of intensive and caring forms of 'welfare' cameralism that formed one of the earliest arts of government. Dillon (1995, 2004) has long insisted that governmentality and sovereignty are not oppositional but complementary, relying upon each other and feeding their power-knowledge needs. While the norms of government and the exceptions of sovereignty are often juxtaposed, they actually depend upon and reinforce each other (Hussain, 2003: 20).

Yet, it would be a mistake to cast sovereignty as the villain of the piece against biopower's heroic stance of making live and letting die (Foucault, 1975–6 [2003]: 241). Dean (2002a) has drawn attention to what

Foucault (1979b) depicted as the ‘dark side of biopolitics’. Though sovereign power kills, it also ‘lets live’, and though biopower ‘makes live’, it can also disallow life, introducing killing machines at the level of the population and making massacres seem vital (Foucault, 1975–6 [2003]: 254, 1979b). While the sovereign right to kill has found itself increasingly restrained, biopolitics has increased its remit to manage life:

not by returning to the old law of killing, but on the contrary in the name of race, precious space, conditions of life and the survival of a population that believes itself to be better than its enemy, which it now treats not as the juridical enemy of the old sovereign but as a toxic or infectious agent, a sort of ‘biological danger’. (Deleuze, 1988: 92)

The publication of Foucault’s 1978 lecture course on *Security, Territory, Population* (Foucault, 1978b [2007]) will do much to set the context of his already published ‘Governmentality’ (Foucault, 1978a [2001]) lecture and to further complicate and imbricate the triangle of sovereign, disciplinary and governmental power (for a discussion of the following year’s lectures on economic liberalism, see Lemke, 2001). Here Foucault denies again that there is a clear transition from legal (sovereign) to disciplinary and then security (governmental) ages, but stresses that the techniques of the legal and disciplinary world were taken up by security mechanisms that seek to regulate populations (Foucault, 1978b [2007], 11 January). He also insisted on complicating the spaces associated with each form of power. Sovereignty did not just refer to empty territory, it concerned itself with the same multiplicity of people targeted by discipline and mechanisms of security. As such, in discussing the town plans that best represented the three forms of power, Foucault referred to Le Maître’s *La Métropolitée* of 1682 (also see Rabinow, 1982). This unbuilt, city plan organised different social groups in relation to each other and placed the capital city in a geometrically central position in the national territory. It was to be an ornament, displaying the best a territory could offer, and as such has many parallels to the utopian elements of New Delhi (see Chapter 2). Yet, the Indian capital also imbricated other types of power relation, creating a complex landscape of sovereignty, government and discipline.

Discipline

For his discussion of discipline, Foucault (1978b [2007], 11 January) turned to the seventeenth century new town of Richelieu which focused more on the distribution of individuals than social groups. The town not only had elements of symmetry, but also included dissymmetry, to allow smaller quarters to spatially express social status. Unlike the capitalisation of territory under sovereignty, here the question was of structuring space. Foucault (1978b [2007], 18 January) later stressed that while sovereign power forbade

and prohibited, proscribing the city and displaying its strength, discipline focused on what one must do, rather than the forbidden, imposing an order from within. This transition was discussed most dramatically in *Discipline and Punish* (Foucault, 1977) showing how sovereign violence was replaced with institutionalised supervision for the criminal. Spatial divisions, time tables, bodily regularisation and different forms of supervision were used to reform the inmates of these institutions. These techniques also swarmed through an increasingly disciplinary society in the hope of creating economically efficient yet politically docile subjects. Foucault did not seek out ideal types to represent disciplinary power. Rather, he traced out the generalities between different techniques that were used to respond to local objectives. This was in an attempt to detect the functions of disciplinary power, which he termed diagrams and most famously examined through the Panopticon (Deleuze, 1988: 72).

Disciplinary power will be discussed and empirically investigated in Chapter 3, the purpose here is to stress its links to other types of power relation. Despite discipline's much-advertised departure from the power relations of sovereignty, this does not make the two incompatible. Foucault (1975–6 [2003]: 260) showed how the racist state, Nazi Germany in particular, brought the classic mechanism of death into perfect coincidence with the discipline and regulation of biopower. Two years later, in a controversial departure from the more dramatic ruptures between sovereign and disciplinary power suggested in *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault (1978b [2007], 25 January) suggested that '... the panopticon is the oldest dream of the oldest sovereign'. As such it was both modern and archaic because the figure at the centre of the Panopticon exerted his, her, or its sovereignty over all the individuals in the machine of power: 'The central point of the panopticon still functions, in a way, as a perfect sovereign' (Foucault, 1978b [2007], 25 January). Sovereign and disciplinary powers could also be bridged by the state that took up mechanisms of discipline and used them in conjunction with the objectives of sovereign power (Foucault, 1977: 213).

Discipline and government were also explicitly linked as they both arose in response to the failure of sovereign mechanisms to deal with the consequences of industrialisation and demographic explosions in early modern Europe (Foucault, 1975–6 [2003]: 249–50). Discipline has an ambiguous relationship to government and security, being one part of the binary of biopower, yet also serving as an opposing pole to the regulation of free populations. Disciplinary mechanisms had been comparatively easy to establish from the seventeenth century onwards, focusing as they did on deviant bodies that were viewed as a threat to social order. Yet, the seething multiplicity of society still needed regulating, although without the intense economic

and investment, and political intrusiveness, of disciplinary surveillance. The response was a series of regulatory mechanisms that sought to normalise society such that it would function efficiently and productively.

Although both discipline and regulation were initially termed acts of 'normalization', they were later distinguished (Foucault, 1978b [2007], 25 January). Discipline analysed individuals, places, times and actions in order to compare them to a pre-existing norm, to which they would then be trained to conform; what Foucault termed 'normation'. In contrast, regulatory mechanisms would examine cases, risks, danger and crises in society in order to calculate the probable norm at which society should function, and to which the unfavourable were brought in line, referred to as 'normalization'. The scale at which regulation operated (the whole population) necessitated the freedom of its subjects. While discipline is centripetal, the population mechanisms of security are centrifugal; while discipline seeks to regulate everything, security observes society and decides what is desirable (Foucault, 1978b [2007], 18 January).

While at the functional level, disciplinary and regulatory mechanisms remain distinct, at the level of technology and practice they intersect, as with discipline and sovereign mechanisms. Foucault (1978b [2007], 8 February) reaffirmed his earlier analysis of the transition from the isolated technique of the Panopticon to the generalised mechanism of panopticism (Foucault, 1977: 213). The displacement of attention outside of disciplinary institutions, where their function became external and their objects of knowledge became more general, raised the question of whether the techniques and strategies of discipline merely fell under the totalising institution of the state. It was in order to go beyond the state, as he had gone beyond disciplinary institutions, that Foucault turned to the study of mechanisms of security, the regulation of populations, and governmental rationalities (governmentalities).

Governmentalities

Foucault (1978b [2007], 8 February) described the governmentality project as seeking the general technology of power that assured the state's mutations, development and functioning. Governmental rationalities emerged that had political economy as their main form of knowledge, the population as their target for regulation and apparatuses of security as their essential mechanisms (Foucault, 1978a [2001]: 219). An apparatus, or *dispositif*, is a concrete assemblage of diverse elements with a particular purpose, specific targets, and controlling strategies (see Rabinow and Rose, 2003). Examining them involves cutting across distinctions of thought, practice and materiality, and studying them at the surface level of the everyday. Such

studies focus on networks of tactics and strategies, not on some structurally hidden level of causation.

There is now an extensive literature regarding governmentality, and the intention here is not to recap this corpus (Burchell et al., 1991; Barry et al., 1996; Dean, 1999; Rose, 1999; Hannah, 2000; Joyce, 2003). The aim, rather, is to place the one previously published lecture (Foucault, 1978a [2001]), which directly addresses governmentality, in the context of the 13 other lectures that were entitled ‘security, territory, population’ but which Foucault suggested should have been called a ‘history of “governmentality”’ (Foucault, 1978b [2007], 1 February). The analytical categories emerging from the governmentality literature that will structure this book will then be described, ahead of an evaluation of the failure of the governmentality literature to sufficiently address the significance of place, resistance, internationalism and criticism.

‘Governmentality’ refers to three things (Foucault, 1978a [2001]: 219–20, 1978b [2007], 1 February):

- (1) *Power*. The emergence and pre-eminence, over discipline or sovereignty, of government as a type of power, which led to certain apparatuses and knowledges.
- (2) *Analytics*. The ensemble formed by institutions, analyses, calculations and tactics that allow population to be targeted through political-economic knowledge and apparatuses of security.
- (3) *Governmentalisation of the state*. The transition from the medieval state of justice to the administrative state.

The governmentality lecture (the fourth in the series, Foucault, 1978b [2007]) emphasised written works from the sixteenth century regarding the ‘arts of government’. Yet, the opening three lectures actually introduced the governmentality concept through the practical measures that emerged in response to a changing political, demographic and geographical reality, not through the mentalities or abstract rationalities of government. This placed the emphasis on the security apparatuses that served to regulate the free movement and circulation of the objects of government. The early lectures addressed, first, spaces of security in relation to town planning; second, the ‘event’ and uncertainty through a discussion of grain trade and human morbidity and, finally, normation/normalisation with regard to vaccination.

The ‘governmentality’ lecture itself then traced the movement from earlier arts of government, which still advised the sovereign and sought to control and supervise the population, to political sciences that sought to observe and regulate the population from a distance. This denoted a shift from the government of things, organising their *disposition* so as to lead them to an end that profited the sovereign, to a government of *processes* that had their

own end and internal logics. The emergence of the economy and the population as concepts, with corresponding political–economic and biopolitical realities that were independent of the sovereign, marked the transition from arts to sciences of government (Curtis, 2002; Legg, 2005a). Biopolitics has been somewhat fetishised in the literature, overshadowing the regulation of other domains of government such as society or the economy (Dean, 2002a: 48). Such domains were obviously interconnected, but the rationalities that were devised to govern them often came into conflict whereby, for instance, free market economics threatened to cause social disruption, or biopolitical schemes to regulate the population proved too expensive.

One of the most formative conflicts was that associated with the rise of liberalism, which Foucault examines as an active art of government rather than a political philosophy (Gordon, 1991; Rose, 1996). Liberalism facilitated the democratisation of rights not only against the sovereign, but also against overly intrusive disciplinary acts of surveillance or ‘over-government’. Security apparatuses sought to protect the ‘liberty’ of free subjects so as to defend supposedly natural economic, social or demographic processes. Yet, these apparatuses simultaneously allowed the acquisition of knowledge about those they sought to protect from over-government, allowing them to normalise any non-self-regulating individuals. As the urban environment displayed ever more pungent and distressing signs of the failure of liberalism in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Europe, attempts were made to integrate individuals into a ‘society’ that would be subject to state programming but distant from it.

The rest of the lectures took in the genealogy of pastoral power, the diplomatic–military technique and that of the ‘police’ of the seventeenth to the eighteenth centuries. The history of the pastorate was examined over five lectures, tracing how this power that individualised and cared for all emerged from the Hebrew–Christian tradition. In attempting to target the intimate level of conduct, pastoral power faced resistance and forms of counter-conduct (Foucault, 1978b [2007], 1 March). Yet, through the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, pastoral government was taken up into the emergent ‘state reason’ of the seventeenth century.

While Foucault devoted much time to his genealogy of the governmentalisation of the state, it is the resultant ensemble of practices and analyses that allow the population to be regulated that are of immediate interest here. Governmentalities are not just ‘govern mentalities’; they also refer to the operationalisation of knowledge, technologies of representation and the execution of a political imaginary (Dillon, 1995: 333). As such, they should be examined not only through discourse analysis but also through more thoroughgoing analytics. Rabinow (1982: 269) defined this as the isolation of historical characteristics that permit us to see how a grid of intelligibility enables actions to proceed. Such an analysis admits that governmental

projects need not have an all encompassing and unifying rationale, but that consistencies within limits recur across different forms of government. An analytic of governmentality stresses that government predominates, but does not decimate, previous types of power relation, and thus that the categories of analytic investigation can be applied to both the poles of biopower and sovereign power. The works of Rose (1996), Dean and Hindess (1998) and Dean (1999) identify dimensions of analysis that enable an investigation of specific manifestations of a governmentality:

- (1) *Episteme*. Distinctive ways of thinking and questioning; the use of certain vocabularies and procedures for the production of truth.
 - (a) Which forms of thought, calculation or rationality are deployed?
 - (b) How does thought seek to transform practices?
 - (c) How do practices of governing give rise to specific forms of truth?
- (2) *Identities*. The epistemological conception of the people to be governed, their statuses and capacities, the shaping of agency and direction of desire.
 - (a) What forms of conduct are expected?
 - (b) What duties or rights do people have?
- (3) *Visibility*. Ways of seeing and representing reality; practical knowledge of specialists and policy makers; plans, maps, diagrams.
 - (a) How are some objects highlighted whereas others are obfuscated?
 - (b) What relations are suggested between subjects and space?
 - (c) How is risk mapped and what are the suggested remedies?
- (4) *Techné*. Techniques and technologies of government; ways of intervening in reality through strategies and procedures in relation to the materials and forces to hand and the resistances or oppositions encountered.
 - (a) Through which mechanism, procedure or, tactic is a rule accomplished?
 - (b) How are local contingencies incorporated and exploited?
- (5) *Ethos*. The moral form that distributes tasks in relation to ideals or principles of government; the orientation invested in practices.
 - (a) Who benefits from a regime of government?
 - (b) Where and with whom are values invested?

A stable correlation across these dimensions suggests a taken-for-granted regime of practices that can be problematised and placed under a programme of reviews. Dean (1998: 185) explicitly suggests that problematisations should be central to an analytical approach that ‘... proceeds from an analysis of, if not their congenitally failing character, their local and particular instances of problematization and reproblematisation’. Similarly, Rabinow and Rose (2003) suggest that apparatuses are initially formed in response to

crises, problems or perceived challenges to those who govern, the resolution of which can lead to more generally applicable governmental rationalities. These problematisations embed the concept of resistance within a critical governmentality perspective, reinforcing a conception of power that draws upon points, knots or focuses of resistance to make change possible, linking it to the outside: ‘... the final word on power is that *resistance comes first*’ (Deleuze, 1988: 89; emphasis in the original).

Just as apparatuses cross-cut divides between the material, performative and the cognitive, so do problematisations target the practical conditions that make something an object of knowledge (Deacon, 2000). But problematisation can also take into account the conditions of emergence of an apparatus and the technologies of self by which humans engage with it.

Genealogy itself is a form of problematising the taken for granted, and it feeds on historical, practical incidents of problematisation to string together its historical analyses. This was most explicitly highlighted in *The Use of Pleasure* (Foucault, 1986a), where problematisations of being and the practices they problematised were used to structure the moral investigation of ‘sexual’ pleasures in ancient Greece and Rome. Foucault (1986a: 36) suggested that sexual conduct was stylised in four ways (dietics of the body, economics of marriage, erotics of boys, and the philosophy of truth) but that these stylisations had certain fields of problematisation in common (questioning ethical substance, types of subjection, forms of elaboration of the self and moral teleology). Exploring this matrix allowed Foucault to examine one surface of emergence of Greek and Roman culture in the ancient world. Although attempts to replicate this analysis can risk becoming too overtly structuralist (Philo, 2005: 331, n. 2), it does allow the framing of empirical investigations that chart the operation of apparatuses which function along the lines of force that constitute different power relations. Such a matrix structures the chapters of this book. Each chapter, to borrow from Rabinow (1989: 14–15) marks an irruptive event that led to shifts in apparatuses of power relations (for comparable approaches, see Chatterjee, 1995, and Ogborn, 1998). Given the range of power relations, and the empirical detail of the case studies, it would be impossible to do justice to the full network involved in each apparatus of control. Rather, each chapter examines a particular form of landscaping as a spatial surface of emergence for each apparatus (see Table 1.1). The analytical categories of the governmentality literature will be used to structure investigations that seek to encompass the range of levels, from categories of thought to performative identities or material technologies, and the relations of power through which such apparatuses operate. These categories will not only be evident throughout the book but will also be returned to in the conclusion to draw out the analytical continuities within Delhi’s governmental regime.

Table 1.1 Analytical chapter structure

Analytic	Residential	Policing	Improvement
Power relation	Classification	Discipline	Biopolitics
Episteme	Imperial urbanism	Colonial policing	Colonial urbanism
Identity	Coloniser	Criminal	Slum dweller
Visibility	Town plan	Riot scheme	Intensity map
Techne	Housing	Surveillance	Dispersion
Ethos	Hierarchy	Partition	Levelling

The selection of landscapes is necessarily arbitrary to an extent, and the lack of focus on trade, craftwork or industrial landscaping risks reproducing a shift away from economic analysis associated with Foucauldian studies more generally. However, Delhi did not have a large industrial labour force until the mid-1930s and its reputation as a centre for craftsmanship traded heavily on its past glories.¹ As such, the examined landscapes focus more on the efforts to secure the two cities made by the central and local governments. These had to respond to problematisations in the realm of accommodation, policing and urban health that overshadowed overly ‘economic’ problems, although tensions with the rationalities of economy and finance recur throughout.

Limits of governmentality

Place?

Foucault had an innate interest in spatial relations (see Driver, 1985; Philo, 1992; Osborne and Rose, 1999; Elden, 2001). This interest expressed itself in the geometric language with which he dissected the archive, his interest in disciplinary spaces of incarceration and segregation and his studies of the use of space to regulate populations (see each chapter for discussions of archaeological, disciplinary and biopolitical approaches to space in Foucault’s work). Yet, there have also been criticisms of his spatial formations. These have suggested that his archaeological, discursive works deploy spatial language while being divorced from the material realm, that his disciplinary diagrams rely too heavily upon plans and not upon constructed realities, and that the governmentality work fails to engage with the territories it claims to order.

For instance, Dupont and Pearce (2001: 133–5) accuse Foucault of ‘objective idealism’ for failing to appreciate the blocks and obstacles to

the development of governmental rationalities, and of 'subjective idealism' for focusing too much on individual authors as opposed to non-subjective rationalities. These criticisms, in part, are due to not only an over-reliance on the one 'governmentality' lecture, but does also hint at a deeper-seated concern with Foucault's approach. This is that while he has an acute awareness of the geometry of power and the striations of social space, he underplays the messy aliveness of place. This is less in evidence in his historical studies than in his more abstract theorisation. As Rabinow (1982: 269) commented, Foucault used space as one of several tools to analyse power-knowledge relations, not always to study the space itself. Yet, spatial studies can open up complex realities in their focus on regimes of practices. Indeed, Dean (1998: 185) associates these regimes with studies of places where rules seek to guide what is done and said.

Foucault's spatial work, especially with regard to disciplinary institutions, is well known (see Chapter 3). The broader scale of governmental regulations means that their geographies are necessarily more diffuse and complex. Hannah (1997) has not only suggested how geographies of discipline and government may interact, but he has also provided a thoroughgoing analysis of governmentalisation of U.S.A. territory in the nineteenth century (Hannah, 2000). Processes of abstraction, assortment and centralisation helped gather the data that allowed the population and territory of the United States to be conceived of, and thus normalised. This normalisation has to take place at the local level, the attendance to which has led to calls for a 'spatial governmentality' (Merry, 2001) or 'realist governmentality studies' (Stenson, 2005). Yet, Macleod and Durrheim (2002: 43) have stressed that Foucault's work on governmentality did not see him abandon his previous commitment to an 'ascending analysis of power' that begins at the micro-scale. Rather, governmentality seeks to unite the local and the national, a type of government that should breed a form of analysis that pays attention to both micro, individualising, and subjectivising processes as well as those that both totalise and objectivise.

However, this matrix of power relations can create a sterile and lifeless depiction of place. Thrift (2007) has argued that Foucault's approach neglected a consideration of not only affect and inanimate 'things', but also of space itself. Order was prioritised over aliveness; the co-occurrence, energy and motion of the world were demoted beneath its diagrams and grids of intelligibility. There is great force to these arguments, encouraging us as they do to think not just of Foucault's geometries of power, but also of his substantive, historical geographies (Philo, 1992).

There are a series of works that encourage us to do this. Huxley (2007) has shown that governmentalities have spatial and environmental logics that have casual effects, which operate through different modes (such as geometric ordering, environmental causality or social disposition). Drawing on

untranslated material, Elden (2007) has shown how Foucault collaborated on a series of projects that examined urban infrastructures, hospitals and the politics of habitat in the mid-1970s as his thoughts on discipline and government were forming. An emphasis on towns as machines, metaphors, territories and spaces of political economy foreshadowed his later work not only on discipline, but also on security.

In his 1976 lecture on discipline and biopolitics, the emergence of the latter was linked explicitly to the ‘urban problem’ and the ‘milieu’ in which people lived (Foucault, 1975–6 [2003]: 245). This link was returned to 2 years later. It was stated emphatically that the problem of the town was at the heart of the different mechanisms of security (Foucault, 1978b [2007], 25 January), and that ‘urban objects’ were the essential condition for the rise of ‘policing’ as an art of government (Foucault, 1978b [2007], 5 April). In discussing the ‘spaces of security’, Foucault (1978b [2007], 11 January) contrasted the sovereign capitalisation of territory and the disciplinary structuring of space to the security-inducing planning of the milieu of events. A milieu, whether natural or artificial (i.e. of physical or human geography), was defined as a space that supported action through mass effects on the population who inhabit it. Circular links are created between effects and causes, and these processes are targeted by urban regulatory interventions. As such, the milieu represents a rare, explicit *spatiality* in Foucault’s work, examining the co-constitutive relation of social and spatial relations.

Yet, where Foucault risks certain collusions with those he seeks to examine are in his operation within the limits of consideration set out by the governmentalities he studies. A detached approach to town planning gives little sense of how these plans were operationalised. An approach to grain and dearth focused around governmental policy gives us little sense of the pain of starvation or the panic buying of the urban market that grain doctrines induced (Foucault, 1978b [2007], 18 January). An emphasis on the emergence of the concept of a population that could only be affected by calculations and distanced controls removed attention from the very real forms of regulation that urban populations were at times exposed to (Foucault, 1978b [2007], 25 January).

In short, Foucault’s emphasis on the spaces of power–knowledge provide fascinating insights into the regimes of practices that are being constructed, but fail to capture the complexity of the places over which these regimes are, not always successfully, extended. Places problematise the operation of apparatuses; they have a tendency to bleed, become infected, break, leak, collapse and also to foster innovation and conspiratorial spaces of counter-conduct or outright resistance. Places are the *excess* of space. But this resistance need not be conscious or human. Power can be exerted over space and, seeing as all power creates resistance, the intransigent landscape can be

considered as a resistant and inseparable element of governmental apparatuses (Joyce, 2003: 185–6). It is this notion of space as a stubborn, alive and problematising medium that will inform the chapters that follow. Here, space is not only a medium of order, but one that also presented the climate and over-crowding of a badly misplanned New Delhi, the unmapped old city, a dangerously undocile nationalism, and the disease and congestion of the walled city.

Resistance?

The call for an appreciation of place in all its complexity does not mean that one must abandon the governmental archives in search of a counter, sub-altern archive. Counter-discourses and, in this case, forces of anti-colonial nationalism were essential to problematising governmentalities and feature prominently in the archive. These movements can be traced exactly *by* their impact on the spaces of ordering that mark the surfaces of different apparatuses. This does not necessarily defuse them of their power or influence; such points of resistance can be analysed to highlight the extent to which seemingly omniscient apparatuses are vulnerable to attack, self-doubt and internal rupture. O'Malley (1996: 323) was right to warn against assuming that all resistance is internalised and neutered. The following chapters will show how programmes of government can fail, not only due to the stubborn materiality of place, but also due to the conscious resistance of those who did not stand to benefit from the colonial ethos.

Foucault has been criticised as the 'scribe of power' (Said in Said et al., 1993 [2004]: 214); explicating a process in which humanity becomes ever more panoptic, carceral, regulated, normalised, conducted and subjectivised. Hindess (1997: 261) has suggested that the problem begins with Foucault's use of the term 'political' and its conflation with the phrase 'governmental'. As opposed to an association simply with the government of the state, other traditions associate the political with the appropriation, redistribution or allocation of the powers of government. Given that modern power depended upon free subjects, individuals must retain the ability to resist. This 'plebeian aspect' springs from the variety of influences open to people as they craft themselves, or the tendency for error and miscalculation to create different, and critical, perspectives on taken-for-granted practices (Ransom, 1997: 117).

Although resistance was more explicitly addressed in Foucault's later work, a more consistent yet implicit emphasis on resistance has been detected by Pickett (1996). In his works on 'insanity', Foucault traced contestations and transgressions of societal limits. In the early 1970s, he wrote about local struggles and resistance as he turned to address power relations

following the student French uprisings of 1968. This led to a more considered 'politics of resistance' in his works from the late 1970s onwards. Here, resistance was stressed as being essential to the practice of power relations and as something that arose from local, material conditions of existence:

For, if it is true that at the heart of power relations and as a permanent condition of their existence there is an insubordination and a certain essential obstinacy on the part of the principles of freedom, then there is no relationship of power without the means of escape or possible flight. Every power relationship implies, at least in potential, a strategy of struggle, in which the two forces are not superimposed, do not lose their specific nature, or do not finally become confused. Each constitutes for the other a kind of permanent limit, a point of possible reversal. (Foucault, 1982 [2001]: 346)

The horizontal unity of resistance was challenged by the segregation of disciplinary practices (Foucault, 1977: 219), but Foucault did elaborate on how individual resistance could be interlinked. Collective resistances had evolved from targeting domination in the feudal period to exploitation in the nineteenth century and subjection in the contemporary period (Foucault, 1982 [2001]: 331). Conceptions of resistance as such have to move on from the model of the revolution that would assume the position of sovereign power and should seek to string together local points of resistance: '... producing cleavages in society that shift about, fracturing unities and effecting regroupings, furrowing across individuals themselves, cutting them up and remoulding them, marking off irreducible regions in them, in their bodies and minds...' (Foucault, 1979b: 96). The most local of these forms of resistance takes place within the self, in which forms of counter-conduct emerge that challenge a regime's advocated government of the self (Foucault, 1978b [2007], 1 March).

Internationalism and criticism?

Foucault was undeniably Eurocentric. The pertinent question is whether this mattered, given that he did not make any claims to be a world historian or a transcendental philosopher? Those who apply Foucault outside of Europe surely bear the burden for translating his work themselves? While this is the case, European knowledges, technologies and epistemologies were dependent upon relations with their colonial 'outsides' (Legg, 2007). Indeed, to fail to appreciate this is to uncritically accept many of liberalism's most misleading arguments. For instance, Adam Smith insisted that value lay in bodies and not land, fostering dreams of perpetual growth. Yet, this dream was dependent upon the conception of the rest of the world as free space that could be appropriated at will (Cooper, 2004: 521). As such, the apparatuses of governmental security associated with liberal economics in

Europe historically relied upon a colonised zone of exception and the exertion of sovereign power over colonial territories. Similarly, Stoler (1995) has dismissed European bourgeois claims to racial superiority and an innately more advanced civilisation by showing how Europe itself was dependent on imperial circuits of identity formation in terms of race, gender and sexuality.

Such arguments will be addressed in the following section, but they necessarily inter-mesh with the debate about 'critical governmentality studies'. Foucault's politics are notoriously amorphous because he consistently refused traditional trajectories of investigation and imperatives to answer traditional political questions. Yet, his political relevance has also been dampened by studies that refuse to take him at his word when he insisted upon studying local struggles over power relations in all their materiality. O'Malley et al. (1997) describe this as an over-emphasis on governmentalities and a lack of emphasis on the 'messy actuality' of rule. This has dulled the critical edge of genealogy and risks turning governmentality studies into a defence of liberalism and a means for its renewal (Stenson, 1998). In so doing, one perpetuates liberalism's greatest achievement and its object; the conduct of conduct from a distance, not here over others through space or class, but over us through time and the archive.

The response is to examine governmentalities in all the detailed confusion of their places of elaboration and in the context of resistance that could both be internalised in programmatic reviews or remain resiliently external and hostile. Analytical categories can, as such, be used to provide not only a 'thick description' of government, but also a critical analysis, revealing disjunctures between governmentalities and practices within a complex topography of rule (Dean, 2002c: 120). This would highlight the continued presence of non-liberal power relations of sovereignty, discipline and biopolitics through an active and focused criticism.

Scott (1999) has faced the challenge of mounting a post-colonial criticism in the face of anti-foundational, post-structuralist suggestions that such criticism must rest on universalisation or must inscribe a new rationalism. His response is to pose criticism as a strategic practice in a contingent problem space that generates specific objects and questions. Each chapter of this book investigates the problem space of a different type of power relation and poses the problematisations that arose within the detailed context of place and resistance that threw the colonial government into question. In line with Dean and Henmann (2004: 492–3), the aim is to address the question 'where of power' by analysing the imbrication of different types of power relation within the zones, spaces and locales in which territories, their inhabitants and their products have been appropriated across the Earth.

Colonial Governmentality

In his influential historical introduction to post-colonialism, Young (2001: 4) insisted that post-colonial analysis should not privilege the colonial, but should examine the effects of colonialism in the present. This Foucauldian history of the post-colonial present would be oriented towards social justice and the contestation of domination. Yet, Young's work itself focuses on the very historical origins of post-colonial theory and, as such, sheds great light on current cultural politics and geopolitics. In a similar vein, while Scott (1999: 16) is committed to tracing the effects of colonial history in the present, he admits that this sort of analysis must begin with the rationalities of rule that colonialism established. This would move beyond a study of behaviour to one of social reforms that altered the terrain of struggle against governmental power. It would also move beyond an examination of resistance to look at how colonial power relations affected the terrain on which resistance could operate. The basis of a post-colonial critique can, thus, be an interrogation of the practices, modalities and projects through which the lives of the colonised were altered. This suggestion drew upon Scott's (1995, reprinted in Scott, 1999) earlier work on 'colonial governmentality' that tailored Foucault's work to the colonial world while retaining an emphasis on the practicalities of rule. This was a contribution to a growing field of literature of which only a rudimentary sketch can be presented here, although individual texts will be engaged with throughout the empirical investigations that follow.

The spatial differences of colonial governmentality

One approach to the difference of colonialism is to sketch a seemingly oxymoronic geography of liberalism. Despite its universal claims, liberty was only granted to those who were sufficiently normalised in line with regularities that emerged in the West, and were most readily apparent in adult, white, heterosexual, able-bodied men (Valverde, 1996; Mehta, 1999; Hindess, 2001; Dean, 2002b). Yet, the governmental rationalities of colonial rule require a more local and material form of analysis. Scott (1995: 192) introduced the approach of colonial governmentality as a means of moving post-colonial analysis beyond considerations of textual representations of authority, the denial of voice and the institutional mechanisms of colonial control. While not denying the importance of such analyses of how the colonised were included or excluded, the emphasis was shifted onto the ways in which colonial power was organised as an activity designed to

produce effects of rule. Scott stressed the contingent nature and discontinuous developments within colonial government itself, as manifested in particular ‘projects’ (Thomas, 1994: 105).

At colonial governments’ ‘points of application’ (Scott, 1995: 199), the emphasis lay on eradicating superstition and prejudice in spaces where socialisation occurred, and on erecting new conditions in their place laid out on clear, rational principles. These ‘cultivated settings’, in Helliwell’s and Hindess’s (2002) terms, aimed to produce governing effects on conduct, that is, to induce a milieu that would improve those who interacted in it: ‘*the systematic redefinition and transformation of the terrain on which the life of the colonized was lived*’ (Scott, 1995: 205; emphasis in the original). Although when compared with the colonial ‘*commandement*’ (Mbembe, 2001) of most African states, India appeared liberal, this was very much a translated and exported brand of liberalism. Studying this translation and disaggregation of state forms is essential if the explicitly ‘Western’ theories of liberalism and governmentality are to be critically and accurately studied outside the West (Hansen and Stepputat, 2002: 10). There has been a protracted debate, however, regarding what the ‘difference’ of colonial government actually is. The perspectives taken on this difference can, very generally, be navigated using the triangular powers of governmentality (see Table 1.2).

As Cooper (2004) has suggested, colonial governments operated in a more intimate relationship with the violence of *sovereign* power. Mbembe (2003) has forcefully expressed this concept in relation to African colonial sovereignty through the concept of ‘necropower’; the government of death, not life. Operating in a state of exception and enmity towards African territory and peoples, colonial governments synthesised massacres and bureaucracy

Table 1.2 Colonial Indian governmentality

	Excess	Neglect
Sovereignty	Violence, ceremony	Democratised rights, centralised state
Discipline	Segregation, incarceration	Swarming, functional inversion
Economy	Exploitation	Withdrawal of state from economic processes
Society	Civilising ethos	Integration beyond the elite
Biopolitics	Knowledge creation, experimentation	Welfare ethos
Pastoral	Hyper-regulation of colonising society	Individualised care are for native population

long before the Nazi state existed. The difference of colonial governmentality was, thus, that violence became the language of right and exception became the structure of sovereignty. Hansen and Stepputat (2005: 18–20) agree that colonies can be thought of as near permanent states of exception, defining themselves through the mercantile and military logic of exploitation, domination and civilisation. Yet, the production of bare life was just one element of sovereignty; in addition there was the performance of public authority and the marking of space through violence and rituals. In this process colonial territories became heavily impressed with the spatial insignia of sovereign power, such as boundaries, hierarchies, zones and cultural imaginaries: ‘Space was therefore the raw material of sovereignty and the violence it carried with it. Sovereignty meant occupation, and occupation meant relegating the colonized into a third zone between subjecthood and objecthood’ (Mbembe, 2003: 16). This violence was not only foundational, in that it created the territory over which it was exercised, but also legitimating, as it provided the model for colonial order, and imaginary, in that it embodied the state (Mbembe, 2001: 25).

In appropriating Foucault’s work on biopower, Mbembe (2003: 7) placed racism at the centre of colonialism’s distribution of death and life. Besides violence, race is most commonly invoked as the essence of colonial difference (Chatterjee, 1993: 14). Yet, while race may provide the over-arching dichotomy of the colonial episteme, Scott (1995: 195) has emphasised the differences in how race was articulated in subject-constituting social practices and how race cross-hatched with different forms of ‘othering’. As such, while colonial governmentality brought forth race as an object of governance, this race was by no means constant (Hussain, 2003: 30).

While race was articulated with sovereign power in terms of violence, sovereignty and race were also imbricated across the range of biopower. Hansen and Stepputat (2005: 5) have insisted that colonial sovereign power was more dependent on spectacles, ceremony and violence than that of European centralised states. Thus, colonial sovereignty was characterised not just by states of exception, but also by indirect rule from a distance, asserted racial superiority and an oppressive governmental apparatus. In terms of another technique of sovereignty, Hussain (2003: 32) and Howell (2004b) have argued that the colonial sovereign state was ‘full of law’, which infused every day practice. Yet, Hansen (2005: 176) has shown that colonial law in India divided offences in line with assumptions about caste and community, embedding the laws within wider governmental programmes.

The translation of *discipline* was an ambivalent one. Outside of the liberal restraints of Europe, disciplinary institutions could experiment with techniques of enclosure and segregation, as witnessed in the penal system (Sen, 2000), the police (Sengoopta, 2003), the regulation of prostitution

(Ballhatchet, 1980; Levine, 2003) and urban reconstruction in the name of political security (Gupta, 1981; Oldenburg, 1984). Yet, at the same time, there was also an unwillingness to invest in the swarming of such expensive institutions (Gregory, 1998; Howell, 2004a). The result, thus, tended to be a tight and intense archipelago of institutions to protect the elite, while the rest of the population was left to the more distanced normalisation of colonial government.

It has been suggested that these actions of colonial *government* marked a stark discontinuity from Western norms. Prakash (1999: 125–7) argued against the idea of a tropicalisation of Western norms in favour of a fundamental dislocation, drawing on the case study of colonial India. Despite this, he uses the analytical categories of governmentality to dissect the difference of colonial Indian society with great acuity. Prakash cites the inability of the colonial states to forge a civil society, its need for despotic governance, its inability to mobilise capillary forms of power and its failure to respect the autonomy of interests outside of the state, in the liberal tradition. The resulting apparatus accrued detailed statistical understanding about India, although the tilting of government towards domination, rather than open power relations, meant that interventions in the disciplinary and governmental realm served as more obvious acts of colonial rule. As Rabinow (1989: 277) has argued, French colonies served as laboratories of modernity in which extra-metropolitan powers were experimented with. While the rhetoric of improvement was deployed, the colonial situation was in fact one of false *fraternité*, the denial of *égalité* and the absence of *liberté*.

This also helps to explain the relative absence of pastoral origins in the genealogies of colonial governmentality. There was very rarely an ethic of caring for *omnes et singulatim* ('all and one', Foucault, 1979a [2001]: 298–325) outside of the boundaries of the colonisers, and even they were more often subject to a disciplinary gaze rather than a confessional and personal interest. For native populations, the welfare ethos was only introduced in the British Empire in the twentieth century under nationalist and international pressure. This is indicative of a more widespread limitation in the activities of the state as played out through the domains of government.

In terms of the social, Kalpagam (2002) has shown that the creation of a colonial public sphere to encourage education and socialisation reverted to a disciplinary silencing when the colonial subjects asserted their own voice. The degree to which this public denoted the 'social' in the European sense has been debated. Prakash (2002) has insisted that the social was striated by religious community, while Chatterjee (2000, 2001, 2004) has argued that the social was divided into an elite, civil society and a political society for the rest of the population (see Chapter 4).

Colonial biopolitics was also heavily weighed upon by the demands of sovereign power for control and knowledge about the subject population.

Censuses and land surveys were implicated in the acquisition of knowledge about the 'disposition of things' and the nature of the multiplicities that had to be governed, although more intimate details were often collected than would have been allowed in liberal Europe (see Legg, 2006a). As such, colonial medicine functioned, and was seen as functioning, as a colonisation of Indian bodies (Arnold, 1993). In highlighting the ways in which Foucault's ideas on biopower had to be translated to analyse colonial Africa, Vaughan (1991) stressed that colonial biopower was more repressive than modern, focused on aggregate ethnic groups more than individuals and favoured generalisations about an already pathological colonial 'other' to detailed medical knowledge.

As a fourth element of translation, Vaughan also stressed that colonial capitalism was less modern and more obviously extractive than European forms, leading to underdevelopment. As part of a capitalist world system, and exploitative empires, colonial economies were often focused on creating cheap exports that could benefit manufacturers in the imperial heartland, while exposing colonial manufacturers to the competition of cheaply produced, industrial goods. This tended to lead to underdeveloped economies without the full spread of economic services and functions that could create robust and integrated economies (Goswami, 2004). However, as the colonial state created an Indian 'economy' through inducing new relations between resources, population and discipline, the emergent practice of economics also allowed nationalists to create an account of financial exploitation in colonial India (Kalpagam, 2000: 420).

As such, colonial governmentality, in India specifically, was subject to a series of excesses and neglects that can serve as a guide to the necessary translations of governmentality to the colonial context. These excess/neglects can be summarised as in Table 1.2.

Prakash (2002: 88) suggested that colonial governmentality's violation of Western norms means that no elegant triangle can be forged between colonial sovereignty, discipline and government. On the contrary, imperialism involves a translation of each of these forms of power to the colonial context, and then a site-based adjustment in relation to the most active 'nodes' in the triangle of power relations. Sovereign power was excessively violent and theatrical, but sovereignty was not devolved to regional governments or individual voting rights. Disciplinary institutions were excessively carceral yet failed to swarm through society or invert their influence onto the wider population. In general, the translation of the modes of power reveals a form of rule that put governmental apparatuses in place, but which had fundamental doubts about the ability of colonial populations to support the processes on which liberal government relied. The economy was thought too underdeveloped to be left to the forces of the free market and was thus heavily intruded upon by the state, although with the minimal investment to

yield the highest profit. Society was thought too irrational and traditional to support representative institutions and too lacking in potential to justify wide-scale educative and/or social programmes. Biopolitically, the state sought knowledge about the details of the multiplicity of peoples within its territory, yet refused to finance welfarist interventions that would have improved the lives of its subject peoples.

That is, colonial governmentality was more an art of government than a science. It remained wedded to the apparatuses of regulation rather than security, to a model of police rather than one of liberalism. The Government of India remained too unsure of its security to rely upon the semi-autonomous processes of society, economy and population, and thus constantly sought to organise the disposition of things, yet with minimal investment or intrusion into the hallowed ground of 'tradition'.

The temporal differences of colonial governmentality

The colonial differences outlined above have mainly concerned power and space; the interflow of governmentalities between core and periphery. However, colonial governmentality varied greatly over time. Mbembe (2003: 17) stressed that late-modern colonial occupation was unique in its combination of the disciplinary, biopolitical and the necropolitical. Indeed, the evolution of colonies over time has tended to more closely imbricate the governmental tripartite. As such, Darwin (1999) has suggested that late-colonial states, and the negotiations they provoked, display at least six common characteristics. In terms of economic and biopolitical rationalities, the state became more *developmental*, by which the economy was modernised and the government of the population opened up to 'expert' influence. State institutions also became *denser* in a belated attempt to create, infiltrate and conduct the 'social'. But the state's sovereignty also underwent a series of shifts. The state became *bigger*, in that it sought to map and control all its territory, although often lacking the resources to do this effectively. Disciplinary and sovereign powers were forced into an alliance to create a *secure* state in the face of anti-colonial nationalism, while state sovereignty itself actually started to crumble. Sovereign boundaries became permeable as the state became more *open* to external influences. This foreshadowed the eventual emergence of the *self-destruct* state as it geared itself towards independence and the transfer of power.

The development of the Indian complex of sovereignty, discipline and government was, of course, incredibly intricate and could not be covered in any detail here. What this complex does show us very clearly is that colonial governmentality by no means reinscribed all earlier forms of sovereignty and power within its own framework (Dean, 2002c: 123). This was

in part because the establishment of permanent administrative and territorial control with fixed borders and centralised administration came late in India's colonial history. As such, the colonial state always existed in a state of externality to an Indian society that was deemed unable of constituting or regulating itself (Prakash, 2002: 82). Even the laws that were introduced in an attempt to guide the subcontinent from oriental despotism to a utilitarian and civilising government failed to penetrate and reconstitute society beyond the institutions that were able to immediately enforce them (Hussain, 2003: 39).

In addition to the externality of the colonial state, previous forms of Indian state formation and government must be taken into account. Traditional Hindu society was not hierarchically organised under a strong state but was decentred and asymmetrically hierarchised in relation to locally stable socio-cultural systems (Kaviraj, 1994: 29). Hansen (2005) has charted the evolution of these forms of sovereignty as Muslim influence spread in the subcontinent from the ninth century. The Mughals invaded India in 1526 under Babur and, within 200 years, had established their authority over most of the subcontinent from their capital at Delhi (Blake, 1991; Hintze, 1997). Mughal forms of sovereignty, which encouraged greater professions of loyalty to the Emperor, imbricated previous forms of sovereignty. They were also forced to adapt to the encroaching sovereign powers of the East India Company (EIC) as it expanded westward from its base in Bengal in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, most notably through the Wars of Annexation (1793–818). It was only in 1803 that Delhi, still the Mughal capital, was taken by General Lake (Spear, 1973).

The EIC utilised forms of sovereignty such as local landholders, courts and religious authorities while slowly extending state-like institutions in a tentative technology of colonial government. Yet, as an imperial ideology began to develop within the British Empire, utilitarian policies began to be introduced to India in the 'Age of Reform' (1828–35). Rail, road, postage and telegraph infrastructures were strengthened, the army was reorganised, education policy was rethought and uncivilised India traditions, such as *sati* (widow immolation) were outlawed (Wolpert, 1977). This acceleration of the governmentalisation of the EIC state, elsewhere founded on excesses of colonial violence, did not have too drastic an effect on Delhi where, as a relative outpost, British residents were left to negotiate the relicts of the Mughal state in a period known as the 'golden calm' (Bayley, 1980). Yet, the movement of the cantonment outside of the city represented a growing distance between the colonising and the colonised societies (Stein, 1998). The British failed to penetrate Indian information systems and thus failed to anticipate the violent 'revolt' (referred to as the Mutiny in imperial historiography, the First War of Independence in nationalist historiography) of

1857 (Bayly, 1996). On 10 May Delhi was taken by the amassed forces and was only recaptured after a three-month siege (Dalrymple, 2006).

The bloody aftermath of the revolt served as the founding act of violence and the mythic origin of the *Raj*, established by the Government of India Act of 1858. After extensive executions and plunder, the entire population of Delhi was evacuated, only to be readmitted after the brutally cold winter season. Over the following years, a third of Delhi's urban landscape was destroyed in order to obliterate the communities that had supposedly conspired against the EIC, and to open the landform up to surveillance and the free movement of the military technology of violence (Gupta, 1981; Hosagrahar, 2005). The revolt offered the final proof that India could not be left unsupervised, with the freedoms of a liberal state. The belief in the 'Sameness' of the Indian population was shattered and largely replaced with the direct rule of an irrational 'Other' (Metcalf, 1994). While a cooperative native elite was crafted into a civil society that could supposedly bridge an increasingly aloof state and an increasingly agitated population, the rest of the population *was* targeted, but through the policies of political society that indirectly manipulated the population through apparatuses of security. Control was exerted over sanitary systems, taxes, public works, burial grounds, housing design and commercial areas in an attempt to improve circulation of air, water and capital. Yet, the population also experienced an increasingly brutal state without the benefits of liberal education or health care: 'The paramount aims of colonial biopolitics were to maintain stability and order, whereas the grooming of colonial quasi-citizens was highly selective and always circumscribed by both class and race' (Hansen, 2005: 177–8).

In terms of sovereign power, besides the continuation of military and police violence, the Victorian Raj was marked by racial distinctions, social hierarchies and excessive displays of the pomp and imperial ceremony, which saw Queen Victoria crowned as Empress in 1877 (Cohn, 1983). A celebratory Durbar was held at Delhi, attempting to tap into the city's ancient prestige, to be followed by a further Durbar, in 1902, celebrated the crowning of King-Emperor Edward VII. The last Durbar, attended by George V, was the ceremony of 1911 at which the capital transfer was announced and Delhi resumed its former status as capital of India. New Delhi would be administered centrally by the Government of India, with mundane duties eventually being passed from Delhi Town Planning Committee (DTPC) to the Imperial Delhi Committee (IDC), which later became the New Delhi Municipal Committee (NDMC). The rest of Delhi Province, an area of 547 square miles crafted out of the Punjab, was governed by a Chief Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner and the Delhi Administration, based in the Civil Lines to the north of Old Delhi (Chopra, 1976). These cooperated with the Delhi Municipal

Committee (DMC), which was presided over by the Deputy Commissioner and attempted to bridge local anti-colonial sentiment and the local administration. Under mounting nationalist criticism (see Chapter 3), the Government was forced to cede certain powers through the Government of India Acts (1919 and 1935) (Bose and Jayal, 1997), although no power was devolved to the Delhi Administration. The latter reform came just 4 years after the inauguration of New Delhi, which was eventually completed in 1931.

New Delhi: Showcase of Sovereignty

There are certain general principles governing town planning in all countries and climates, though they must vary with the motif of the city. First and foremost among these the Committee put the need of foresight . . . Whatever eventualities the days to come may have in store, the new city must have at its hand the inherent power to command health, and a wealth of air spaces and room for expansion, which no lapse of time can deplete . . . There must be beauty combined with comfort. There must be convenience – of arrangement as well as of communication. The main traffic routes must be parkways capable of extension both in width and length . . . Where possible, there should be presentation of natural beauties – hill, wood and water – and of monuments of antiquity and of the architectural splendours of modern times. Space is needed for recreation for all classes. The result must be self contained yet possessing a latent elasticity for extension. The perfected whole should be obtainable with due regard to economy.

To all this must be added the special principles governing the town planning of a particular site. In the case of Delhi the Committee conceive the chief of these to be a realization of the dominant idea of the new Delhi and the adaptation of the scheme of the new city to physical conditions. Delhi is to be an Imperial capital and is to absorb the traditions of all the ancient capitals. It is to be the seat of the Government of India. It has to convey the idea of a peaceful domination and dignified rule over the traditions and life of India by the British Raj.² (Delhi Town Planning Committee, 1913)

The transfer of the capital of British India from Calcutta, in the north-east of the subcontinent, to the more centrally located Delhi was not just motivated by location. It sought to remove the headquarters of the Government of India from the increasingly revolutionary province of Bengal, and to tap into the traditions and mysticism of Delhi, which had historically played host to 11 capitals, dating back to the construction of Indraprastha (c. 900 BCE). The transfer was undeniably a top-down decision, proposed by Viceroy Hardinge and a handful of close colleagues to the King in a confidential memorandum. The design of the capital was delegated to the DTPC, headed by

Captain George Swinton and including Edwin Lutyens, the future chief architect.

The DTTC had to negotiate a series of competing claims, and in so doing created a unique hybridisation of the imperial and the modern. As the quotation above denotes, the new city would embrace the emergent art of modern town planning. It would embody progress and foresight, anticipating and providing for the future, while combining functional comfort and economy with beauty of form. Yet these seemingly universal principles of urban government had to be tailored to the site, and to the political context. The new city was not just to be a colonial city, one of government, administration and bureaucracy. The working name for the new city was initially 'Imperial Delhi'. This denoted the centrality of the city to the twentieth-century aesthetic of British imperialism and its performance of showcase imperial sovereignty for an increasingly aggressive nationalist audience.

While this book will highlight how the capital project failed in many senses, it undeniably succeeded in its showcasing mission. The Viceroy's House and All-India War Memorial Arch by Edwin Lutyens and the Secretariats and Legislative Assembly by Herbert Baker have been near universally acclaimed. Amongst other things, this was for balancing the assimilation of local cultures within the civilising influence of Western architecture, and accommodating Indian traditions through the uptake of indigenous architectural forms.

As such, New Delhi can be read as a space of sovereignty in at least three respects. Firstly, the capital transfer marked an undemocratic decision by the ultimate authorities in the Empire to construct a new city. Secondly, the landscape aesthetic of the city represented the 'peaceful domination' of the Indian people. Finally, New Delhi has masterfully exerted its sovereignty over colonial urban historiography, establishing itself not only as a landform of utmost academic importance, but also as a self-contained city with sovereign boundaries and a clear distinction from the neighbouring city of 'Old Delhi'. Yet, the relationship between the new and old Delhis was not just one of separation, but also one of eclipse. This was a local and historical process in terms of prestige, financing, policing and improvement. Yet, the shadow cast by the new capital has also fallen upon colonial and nationalist historiographies, as well as architectural and urban works of research. As a space of colonial violence and display, or a site of nationalist resistance, mobilisation or factionalism, Old Delhi has been distanced and silenced. It is chained to a binary that depicts it as subordinate, Old and Other, against the powerful, New, colonial Self of the capital.

This silencing is a by-product of broader trends in historical and theoretical literature. The historiographical tradition of colonial urbanism has often supported the 'dual cities' hypothesis, encouraging the study of European settlements that bordered, and even intruded upon, native settlements

(Abu-Lughod, 1980, 1965). This focus has often eschewed the more widespread and insidious means by which colonial influence pervaded the native urban landscape (Yeoh, 1996; Çelik, 1997). This trend, in turn, feeds into, and has emerged from, the more theoretical tendency to study the policies of governments in abstract terms that deny the specificity of place, resistance and international context and fail to provide opportunities for political critique. The following two sections will mobilise a Foucauldian approach to the spatial relations of Delhi to counter these two shortsights. The existing literature on Delhi will be reviewed to highlight the need for an approach that is cognisant of, yet not dominated by, the sovereign authority of New Delhi. Second, the local commentary on the inauguration ceremonies of 1931 will be reviewed to highlight the immanent potential for critique within the city itself.

A case for urban regicide? Beyond the capital

We need to cut off the King's head: in political theory that has still to be done.
(Foucault, 1980: 121)

In adopting a Foucauldian approach to power relations, this book will seek to explore power in its various guises, from the disciplining of individuals to the regulation of the population, removing attention solely from sovereigns who detract resources from a position of externality to their population and territory. This politico-philosophical regicide will have a geographical corollary in Delhi, diverting attention away from the capital and into the urban capillaries and habitats of the two cities. Yet, the forceful presence of New Delhi's imperial landscape stands as a reminder that power relations cannot be conceived without sovereign power. Because of the lasting allure of this latter power, the literature on Delhi has mostly failed to divert attention away from the showcase buildings at the heart of the city, or onto the older city beyond the capital.

King's (1976) study of New Delhi avoided the pitfalls of many later studies by focusing on the symbolism and layout of the city as a whole rather than the central complex. Within the geometrically aligned street roads, most of which were at 30°, 60° or 90° to the horizontal monumental axis of Kingsway, King analysed the hierarchical grid of social stratification along which government employees were distributed within the city (see Chapter 2, Figure 2.1). The bungalow compounds and their allocation formalised pre-existing social norms, as King (1976: 244) stressed: 'Distinctions hitherto informal or unarticulated were now clarified in the ordered physico-spatial divisions of Delhi.' King himself drew on the substantial work of Thakore (1962, see also Bopegamage, 1957; Mitra, 1970) who had studied the layout and history of the New Delhi plan, and devoted a large

section of his work to analysing the spatial segregation of social class within the city. These patterns were also evident in the temporary capital to the north of Old Delhi, in which the government was housed from 1912 to 1926 while New Delhi was constructed. Such patterns necessarily disintegrated in Simla, the summer capital in the foothills of the Himalayas to which the whole government annually migrated. Following King, many commentators have summarised the residential divisions as part of what Davies (1985: 274) called the 'petrification' of Edwardian India in the urban landscape (also see Sealey, 1982).

Yet, following Irving's (1981) exemplary study of the capital, successive authors have focused on the architectural heritage and design of New Delhi. Vale (1992: 56) has suggested that the continuity of themes and designs in capitals including Washington DC, New Delhi, Canberra, Ankara, Chandigarh and Brasilia forms a 'hermetic dialogue'. Jain (1990) has even attempted to link the alignments and functions of the city to the ancient Indian Vedic texts, although they were actually dictated by Viceroy Hardinge, aligning Kingsway with Indraprastha Fort and Parliament Street the Jama Masjid in Old Delhi (Nilsson, 1973: 54). Davies (1985: 215) suggested that the relevant context for New Delhi was that of the high British Imperialism of the late Victorian period, which called for a common architectural language to unify the Empire and represent Britain's strength.

Other studies have focused on the nature of this representation in New Delhi. Metcalf (1989) has stressed the repeated calls to include traditional Indian styles and craftsmanship in the capital, while Volwahren (2002) has comprehensively traced the architectural genealogy of the city. Ridley (2002) has detailed the personal politics between Baker, Lutyens and Hardinge who favoured, respectively, the interweaving of Indian features within the narrative fabric of imperial architecture, the elemental and classical architectural style, and an Indo-Saracenic compromise. While Stamp (1981) and Ridley (2002) have insisted that, in the 'Battle of Styles', Lutyens succeeded in synthesising the east and west, Tillotson (1989: 122) maintains that eastern features serve only as 'punctuation marks' on an essentially Western building (see Hopkins and Stamp, 2002, for a contextualisation of Lutyens's international work).

Another aspect of the New Delhi literature has stressed its ceremonial and ritualistic spatiality (Hosagrahar, 1992). Viewing the landscape in its performative dimension, Christensen (1995: 43) argued that the opening ceremony of New Delhi in 1931 marked an evolving imperialism in which Dominion status was under debate. This was an Empire at the beginning of the short twentieth century, not the end of the long nineteenth. As such, Hall (1988: 177–88) categorised New Delhi as a 'City of Monuments' and as part of the 'City Beautiful' movement, alongside Chicago, Berlin and Moscow. Likewise, Dalrymple (1993: 82) links the ceremony, inhuman scale and

racially superior ideology of New Delhi to Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. Less extremely, Stamp (1981: 40) stresses the modernism of the capital, relating it to the industrial and the commercial.

All these texts are indebted to Irving's (1981) pioneering work, yet many failed to stress the ambiguities and tensions within the capital as he did. Lord Curzon, the ex-Viceroy, vociferously opposed the move from Calcutta, the trading communities in Bengal bemoaned their loss of influence, there was continued debate regarding whether the city should be located north or south of Old Delhi, while Viceroy Hardinge was nearly killed in an assassination attempt during his State entry into Delhi in 1912. The time span and cost of the project spiralled out of control while the Great War drained resources from the capital project. Most famously, Lutyens and Baker consistently disagreed over fundamental elements of the city's design leading to a series of furious rows.

However, Irving's study is conducted in a near vacuum regarding Indian politics, with the growing nationalist movement only being mentioned in the conclusion (Rabinow, 1983). Similarly, Old Delhi is only mentioned as a distant referent. A few authors have rectified this pattern. Morris stated that

New Delhi was an anomaly – too late for arrogance, too soon for regrets, too uncertain to get its gradients right ... The city lacked both the insolence of conquest and the generosity of concession, and by its deliberate separateness it perpetuated invidious old comparisons. (Morris, 1983: 221–2)

Such comparisons included those of death rates, which in the old city were four times that of the new. Architectural comparisons between the two cities have also been made. Sorkin (1998: 67–8) commented that New Delhi was designed as the inverse of the winding streets of Old Delhi, while Evenson (1989: 148) suggested that the possibility of the two cities visually harmonising was never seriously considered (although Lanchester's original plans for the city proposed just that). Evenson summarised the attempts to improve the old city (see Chapter 4), while Chatterjee and Kenny (1999) have emphasised how these works related to the new capital. Despite these few examples, the overwhelming impression given in the literature is that there was only an insignificant measure of interaction between the New and Old Delhis. Yet, Gupta (1981) has shown that before, and during, the construction of the new capital the old city was a space of intensive governmental violence and regulation, as Hosagrahar (2005) has charted through the architecture of the city.

In fairness to those who have written on New Delhi, they are situated within a much wider historiographical trend that has fortified the dual city divide of the colonial/native urban form (see the concluding chapter for a discussion of recent colonial urban studies that buck this trend). Çelik (1999: 374) has noted that many studies of 'non-Western cities' attach them to

binaries in which they are denied autonomy. As she stated, ‘Behind the clear message conveyed by the image of dual cities at first sight, however, hide more complicated implications’ (Çelik, 1997: 5). King (1992: 341) has, likewise, stressed that (post)colonial urban studies still render indigenous cultures as ‘traditional’, which epistemologically prolongs the original colonisation. This should be met, King suggests, with an emphasis on the colonised and the subaltern, seeing the colonial city as what Yeoh (1996) terms a contested terrain of daily routines and conflicts.

There is also a more fundamental tension regarding power relations that is being brought into the dialogue here. Butler (1997: 2) has articulated this tension as the paradox of subjection. Firstly, power often appears as dominance by an external force; that which subordinates and relegates lower orders. But, following Foucault, Butler also suggests that power constitutes and provides the conditions for existence of those who are subjected. While power *does* press down on individuals through certain techniques or strategies, it also infiltrates, creates and alters the constitution of the subjects of power. This is very much a spatial process, and the geographies of this power (Allen, 2003) remain lost for many of the ‘native’ or ‘local’ cities that were drawn into colonial power relations. Butler’s theories on performativity and subjectivisation suggest one way of considering these geographies, yet her failure to maintain an emphasis on local, material power relations means that she misses out on many of the main points of instability that animate social practices (Mills, 2003). Similarly, Said’s (1978) combination of Gramsci’s coercive elements of hegemony with the Foucauldian discursive production of complicity presented a theoretical solution, but one that Said (1986) himself rejected on the grounds of Foucault’s anti-humanism, his apparent apoliticism and his failure to theorise resistance. The continued engagement of post-colonial scholars, and others, with Foucault’s later work suggests that Said’s pessimism was not justified, while the recently translated lecture courses of Foucault are shedding light on the degree to which sovereign power intersected with biopower in modern governmentalities. As such, the task is not one of removing the capital, of urban regicide, but of situating sovereignty within the dense network of urban power relations upon which it depended.

The tombstone of the Raj?

Although the emphasis of this book will be upon the government’s ordering of colonial space, this took place within the context of an emergent and highly effective anti-colonial nationalism (as explored in Chapter 3). The Rowlatt disturbances of 1919 marked Mahatma Gandhi’s first mass movement, which was followed by the campaigns of Non-cooperation (1920–2),

Civil Disobedience (1930–2) and Quit India (1942). These movements created and capitalised upon a groundswell of discontent and rejection of the colonial government, which not only saturated the old city but also penetrated the New Delhi. Yet the capital also revealed itself as an aporetic crisis object in the field of representation (Shields, 1996). Irving (1981) has shown how the design, construction and cost of the city were all criticised. Yet, there was also a mixed local reception at the inauguration of the city that pre-figured its problematic operation as a fully functioning city.

Many of the statements produced in appreciation of the city during the inauguration unintentionally echoed the wishes of the DTPC, as is evident from the quote that opened this section. Viceroy Irwin's speech on 10 February 1931 echoed the need for *foresight* and professed a desire to protect the city from the evils that accompany city growth. The *economy* of the city was commented upon, although only to marvel at just how much the city had cost; the £10 million price tag being way in excess of the original budget.³ The *imperial* nature of the project also occupied a number of commentators. A special edition of the *Indian State Railway Magazine* commented that the city had managed to combine east and west, amalgamating influences from antiquity to the Mughals (Shoosmith, 1931). The *Daily Herald* referred to it as 'A dream city of the East, in which is mingled the best of the west ...'⁴ Yet the city was more widely described in terms of the West surpassing the despotic and collapsed cultures of the East. In an article for *The Bengal, Bihar and Central India Annual*, Mrs Shoosmith, the wife of an architect involved in the project, classified all past capitals in Delhi as military despotisms, while the new city hosted representatives of India's constitutional government.⁵ The approval of New Delhi's representation of the new sovereignty continued:

On a massive foundation of red, fortress like, rooted in Indian tradition, stand the white columns and walls of palaces of an age of greater enlightenment . . . Now darkness shrouds the older Delhis and engulfs the historic plain; while, strangely and dramatically illuminated from below, the great dome of the palace, like some gigantic presiding genius, broods over the new City. (*The Bengal, Bihar and Central India Annual*, 1931)

In terms of the DTPC's 'special principles' for Delhi, the British press reserved attention for the capital's function as the seat of government. The *Daily Telegraph* suggested that the city would appeal to the legends of the Indian past, reinforcing the permanence of British sovereign rule,⁶ as coordinated in what the Canadian representative at the inauguration ceremony referred to as a 'temple of government'.⁷ This function was intimately connected to what the DTPC referred to as the 'peaceful domination' of the Indian people. *The Observer* commented that the prophesy that any Empire which located itself in Delhi would be lifted because '[t]his is the end of

the old Empire, and its transformation into the British Commonwealth of Nations at the Crown's own initiative'.⁸ *The Guardian* also looked optimistically towards the future, reading New Delhi not as a vainglorious gesture of domination but as the home from which India would plan her future.

There was, however, a counter-discourse that stressed the more negative aspects of this showcase of imperial sovereignty. Architectural criticism of the city had continued since the opening debates regarding the designs. The Government was forced to respond in the Legislative Assembly in 1927 to reports that New Delhi was ugly, unoriginal, of unimaginative pomposity, monotonous mediocrity and was more in the nature of a prison than a habitation.⁹ *The Times Book of India* (1930: 161) pointed out that the accommodation provided in New Delhi was totally inadequate for the government's clerks and that they had been forced to add to congestion in Old Delhi.

Such feelings were further provoked during the inauguration, which took place just a month after the suspension of the Civil Disobedience campaign that had been led by Gandhi since March 1930. As such, the disciplinary actions of the state were highlighted in the *Hindustan Times*' editorial of 13 February. Viceroy Irwin was mocked for suggesting that the bonds of the empire were 'freedom' when thousands of people were still in jail for attempting to exercise that freedom. The state's government in the economic domain was also criticised because the 'repressive regime' had worsened the effects of the Depression, making the lavish inauguration celebrations an insult to the Indian people.

The ethos of the celebrations was also criticised: 'The whole outlook of the proceedings was imperialistic and gave one the impression of having been designed to demonstrate the supremacy of the White man. An underlying strain of imperialistic sentiment was present throughout His Excellency the Viceroy's speech.' The celebration was said to ignore Indian sentiment, which was still despondent at the repression of Civil Disobedience and was mourning the death of nationalist leader Motilal Nehru. British papers were also critical. *The Times* decried the lack of popular support and the plastering of the city with armed police who stamped out any demonstration.¹⁰ Picking up on this depressed atmosphere, the *Yorkshire Post* commented on 11 February 1931:

A solvent of ancient griefs, a cement of new loyalties, an earnest of cooperation – these, it may be, were the hopes chiefly placed upon the conception of Imperial Delhi when the project was formally proclaimed ... Yet the situation has changed ... So New Delhi is inaugurated in an atmosphere of political uncertainty rather than of political confidence. There are in India those who see in it a memorial, indeed, to British enterprise and orderly development, but also a sepulchre of British influence and authority in India. It appears to them the tombstone of the British Raj.

The contrast could not have been greater than when Gandhi arrived in the city a week later. As opposed to the attendance by invite at the inauguration, and the muted celebration of an antiquated imperial aesthetic, Gandhi was rapturously received by an estimated 60,000 people in Old Delhi. Many of these followed him to the Viceroy's House in New Delhi where he negotiated terms with Viceroy Irwin.¹¹ This performance of the avatar of anti-colonialism within the heart of the imperial capital represented a more thoroughgoing resistance to, and failure of, the imperial project that had been gradually developing within the capital city, as demonstrated in the following chapter.