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There is a story that I have heard enough times in the context of casual conversations with students here in Arizona to realize that it is not that uncommon. It is the story the speaker tells of being born in Mexico and moving to the United States with one's family at a young age. It is the story of returning to Mexico to visit relatives and being considered "too American" and living in the US and being considered "too Mexican." It is a story of negotiating between the cultures of home with one's parents and school with one's peers and work with one's colleagues. And all the while there is a realization that all these constituencies are pressing for one to make a choice: Which do you want to be? And one can't put off that choice forever. But there's also the feeling that there isn't much choice; these others have already made up their mind about what you are (or should be).

There is another story that I've been told, and that is a story where society presumes that the speaker fits the above story. That is, the speaker is frustrated that others keep assuming that just because one looks Latino that one must be a recent immigrant (legal or not) and that one must have a "real home" elsewhere or that one must be fraught with an identity crisis. And all this based on name and skin tone.

Sunaina Marr Maira (2002) tells a story of children of immigrants from India living in the US who, when they go off to college, become more "Indian" than they had been growing up. They profess a passion for traditional Indian customs, music, dance, film, and food, begin to hang out almost exclusively with others also of Indian descent, and

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sometimes even create an accent. If one doesn't follow the group with these activities, one is considered a "fake Indian."

Eric Ma (2002a, 2002b) tells the story of young men in Hong Kong who use rap music and the dress and style of hip hop culture, culture and music created in the urban African American communities of the US, in order to address their own urban experience, what it means to be young, male, and unemployed as one of the world's most dynamic cities rides an economic crisis.

Arun Saldanha (2002) tells the story of elite youth in Bangalore, India, who cruise the streets of the city in luxury cars playing the latest Western pop hits on the car stereo system. The car becomes a self-enclosed mobile bubble of transnational cosmopolitanism while the dark glass of its windows reflects the poverty of the city and its inhabitants back on themselves.

I'll tell you one more story, a sixth one, and that is my own. I was born in the US, but spent all my pre-teen years in Southeast Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East. Since returning to the US as a teenager, I've constantly had to reconcile that experience with the expectations and experiences of those around me. In the US, I *looked* much like my classmates (that is, white, from English, Scottish, and Central European stock), but *thought* much differently. Though I am a US citizen (related, at least according to family stories, to Martha Washington), I do not consider myself an "American" in any easy sense.

These stories are stories of the struggle for identity; to find out for oneself who one is, and to be that in the face of what everyone else seems to think you should be. These are stories of a struggle with the idea that one can only be one thing or the other; that there is a choice, and that one can choose to be authentic this or authentic that, or not. These are stories which are not new, but I feel are growing in frequency worldwide. These are stories of people in a particular place, at a particular time, who are dealing with the legacies of other places and other times. We could state that these are stories of globalization, and they are, though they seem much more personal than the issues usually addressed around that trendy term. But most of all these are stories of culture, of the realm of meanings, traditions, and experiences; of the frameworks through which people make sense of their lives and how parents, friends, and people on the street seek to shape that framework. These are stories of culture in a global time.

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The anthropologist Arjun Appadurai (1996) gave us a very productive image by which we could imagine the complexities of globalization. Globalization is not a single process, happening everywhere in the same way. Globalization is made up of a series of processes, some of which are working in opposite directions and with opposite ends. These processes are all about movement: that of people; of media images and products; of technologies and industries; of money and finance; and of political ideologies. Others have added to the list: the movement of religious ideas, of academic theories, and so on. Appadurai imagines these processes as landscapes, so we can imagine a landscape of people, some moving and some standing still, some moving voluntarily, some out of necessity, some at gunpoint, and we see some embedded in a particular landscape for generations. Or we could picture a landscape of media images and products: Hollywood films; Bollywood films (from Bombay); and Hong Kong films, all circulating on certain paths, appearing in certain venues, and moving on.

This is not a book that addresses things on the scale that Appadurai (and most of the rest who speak of such issues) does. Rather, this is a book about where these processes impinge on everyday life. This is not about globalization in the abstract or about culture or identity in the abstract. It is about the process of trying to negotiate, personally, with these pressures and ideas. This is a book about dilemmas, but not a book about solutions; it is a book about posing the sorts of questions that at least make us realize that, for example, we're being forced to choose what we are.

The first question we have to ask is "what is culture?"

Culture

Culture is one of the two or three most complicated words in the English language.

(Williams, 1983, p. 87)

The idea of culture is key to this book, because it is, after all, about *cultural* globalization and not just globalization. Culture is a word that is both powerful and ubiquitous. It is also fairly vague and can be used to mean a variety of quite contradictory things. But it is important

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for us to begin this book with something of a theoretical frame, a perspective or way of thinking about culture that connects it to our everyday lives and shows us how we can be so connected globally.

This book is something of a journey through the landscape of global culture. Like any journey it is partial because one follows a particular path and not another, one visits one place and not another, and so on. The purpose of this first chapter on culture is to pick up some traveling companions for the trip in the form of a series of concepts which, in different ways, become linked. Not all will be useful at every stop of the journey, but they help us to be prepared for what we may encounter. The companions go by the names of culture, habitus, territory, power, identity, popular culture, ideology, and hegemony. They'll be wearing name tags for a while to help keep them all straight. But this is neither an innocent conceptual toolbox nor a random assortment of concepts. It is not even a survey of concepts related to culture or globalization that one might find in a traditional textbook. This assemblage of concepts is a particular way of thinking about culture and identity which I feel is especially useful in a globalized culture. The rest of the book is basically an argument for the usefulness (or usability) of this framework and how it raises necessary questions which are important now.

First (following Raymond Williams) a brief detour through English history to try to explain what we mean when we say "culture." Before the Industrial Revolution, culture meant the tending of natural growth, like plants or animals (hence our term, "agriculture"). When applied to humans it came to mean the process of human development such as training and growth. Culture was a process, one was cultivated. With the turn of the nineteenth century, culture became a thing in and of itself. It was used to stand for the end result of the processes of cultivation. A person had culture if they had been appropriately trained and educated. But the term was also thought more broadly to mean "the general state of intellectual development, in a society as a whole" (Williams, 1961, p. 16). Culture became synonymous with civilization. It came to describe what was thought of as a general, universal process of human development and the results of that process. These results were the cultural products that were evidence of being civilized: music, art, literature, and so on. Culture was then the embodiment of a tradition and a history, the artistic record of a

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society. But Williams reminds us that tradition is selective; what is selected to be part of this Great Tradition, as it is sometimes called, consists of very specific items that service a social ideal. And so, therefore, for over a hundred years what was considered culture was the works of white males, usually those from the educated classes. In European writings culture was seen as an ideal that Europe had achieved but other countries were found wanting. At the height of colonialism, culture became a means of comparison, if not moral evaluation, of the supposed worth of a group of people.

There was another development around this time that helped to emphasize this particular elitist view of culture, and that was the growth of mass culture brought about by the industrialization of printing (resulting in cheap newspapers) and the increase in literacy among the working classes as the result of a new push for popular education. The idea of culture as a moral evaluation was applied to these new developments. And so, within a society, Britain for example, you had two different cultures: High culture, which embodied the ideals of the nation (associated with high art, philosophy, and education) and low culture (or mass culture), which is what the bulk of the population consumed. These latter texts, songs, and artworks were decidedly not considered to embody the ideals of the society, but to be mere trash. In fact, according to how the term had been used, these latter texts, songs, and artworks were not considered “culture” at all. This distinction between high and low culture was then used to make a moral judgment of the people that consumed them. If you read the great works, the argument goes, you will become refined. If you read trashy novels, you yourself become trashy; you became one of the “masses.”

This distinction still exists today, but to a lesser extent than before. But back in the 1950s, when Williams began writing about culture, the distinction was still very much in place and Williams took the dismissal of the greater part of the population as mere uncultured, ignorant, worthless masses personally. He took it personally because he had grown up in a working class family in Wales, had received a scholarship, and had studied at Oxford. He realized that the so-called “masses” who were being so easily degraded and dismissed in the teashops and lecture halls of Oxford were his family and friends, and he felt insulted. To treat any group of people, as a whole, as if they

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had uncritical minds and no means of creating culture, was untenable to Williams. And so he proposed the fairly simple concept that culture was ordinary. What he meant by this was that the processes of culture, which were the inheritance of a tradition and also the testing of that inheritance within the context of one's everyday life, did not just occur with certain peoples or works, but were the basic processes of everyone's everyday lives. They were normal processes. They were ordinary.

Indulge me for a moment and let me quote Williams at length because he says these things much better than I:

Culture is ordinary: that is the first fact. Every human society has its own shape, its own purposes, its own meanings. Every human society expresses these, in institutions, and in arts and learning. The making of a society is the finding of common meanings and directions, and its growth is an active debate and amendment under the pressures of experience, contact, and discovery, writing themselves into the land. The growing society is there, yet it is also made and remade in every individual mind. The making of a mind is, first, the slow learning of shapes, purposes, and meanings, so that work, observation, and communication are possible. Then, second, but equal in importance, is the testing of these in experience, the making of new observations, comparisons, and meanings. A culture has two aspects: the known meanings and directions, which its members are trained to; the new observations and meanings, which are offered and tested. These are the ordinary processes of human societies and human minds, and we see through them the nature of a culture: that it is always both traditional and creative; that it is both the most ordinary common meanings and the finest individual meanings. We use the word culture in these two senses: to mean a whole way of life – the common meanings; to mean the arts and learning – the special processes of discovery and creative effort. Some writers reserve the word for one or the other of these senses; I insist on both, and on the significance of their conjunction. The questions I ask about our culture are questions about our general and common purposes, yet also questions about deep personal meanings. Culture is ordinary, in every society and in every mind. (Williams, 1989, p. 4)

By arguing this, however, Williams is not arguing for a cultural relativism: that all cultures are equally valuable and that we cannot make

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any judgments of artistic value. He writes, later in the same essay, that “[a]t home we met and made music, listened to it, recited and listened to poems, valued fine language. I have heard better music and better poems since; there is the world to draw on” (p. 5). What he is arguing *against* is the a priori dismissal of people and their culture, and what he is arguing *for* is the recognition that there are many, many other ways of making meaning, many other traditions, and many ways of testing, shaping, and challenging those meanings and traditions. In fact, he is not simply arguing that the elite should recognize the culture of the working classes, but that everyone should recognize the richness of their common cultures. The key to accomplishing this goal is education. Education, Williams writes, is ordinary: “that it is, before everything else, the process of giving to the ordinary members of society its full common meanings, and the skills that will enable them to amend these meanings, in the light of their personal and common experience” (p. 14). In other words, to give people the resources they need to understand the range of common cultures and the means to change these in light of their own experience. That is, to recognize that one has options (that the world is a wide place, and that there are other poems and songs, some better and some not) and to provide some of the tools necessary to engage more directly in the forces (social, political, and cultural) that shape one’s everyday life.

There are some problems with Williams’ argument that need to be addressed before we can move on. And one of these is the reason that I have not been entirely true to Williams in the above summary. Williams writes of the common culture, and I write of the common cultures. If culture is a whole way of life, whose way of life dominates? If the goal is a common culture, whose culture becomes common? Indeed, historian E. P. Thompson (1961) revised Williams’ phrase to argue that culture is a “whole way of struggle.”

Another issue is the amorphous nature of a “whole way of life.” How does one distinguish between one person’s whole way of life and another’s? What distinguishes one culture from another? Any two cultures will have some things in common, and some things different. What counts as a whole way of life? Can an individual have a culture that is not in some way shared with others? If so, do we lose any sense of common culture and end up back in a cultural relativism? As a means of convenience, we often use demographic categories to

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mark distinctions between cultures. So there are cultural differences because of race and ethnicity, class, gender, sexual orientation, geographical location, generation, etc. However, which of these categories matter at any particular place and time are culturally and historically contingent. Williams, for example, foregrounds class differences and ignores differences in ethnicity. In the US, on the other hand, ethnic and racial differences tend to get emphasized and class gets shorter shrift. But while it may be convenient to talk about the differences, for example in the US context, between Northern culture and Southern culture, we can never predict from that the meanings, life experience, or even culture of any particular individual within those areas.

It's a bit of a mess. As I said, it's a difficult concept. But for now I want to hang on to the general sense of culture as being a whole way of life, that is culture as the ordinary processes of meaning making, of traditions, and creativity. And we also need to recognize the two-sided, processual nature of culture as we discuss particular cultures in different parts of the world and their struggles between tradition and change. Culture is always dynamic, traditions will always change, but we also need to recognize that there might be things to hang on to from a tradition while at the same time acknowledging that just because something is a tradition doesn't mean that it should continue. It is not my goal in this book to provide the reader with a set of criteria for making these decisions, but rather to set out examples of these processes and hopefully the means to recognize these processes in other contexts and the impetus to find the resources necessary for that situation to make an honest judgment about these decisions and processes.

These then are some of the issues regarding the idea of culture more generally. However, we will be spending time in a particular realm of culture, popular culture, which I need to say a word about here. The terms *popular culture* and *mass culture* are often confused. Mass culture refers to cultural products that are mass produced (like CDs). Popular culture is often thought of as culture that is popular (that is, that many people purchase or participate in), but a better way of thinking about it is that popular culture is culture that people themselves have made, rather than culture that is made for them. This distinction is one emphasized by communication scholar John Fiske (1989, p. 25): "Popular culture is made by the people at the interface between the products of the culture industries and everyday life." It

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is, in part, what we do with the mass media products once we have obtained them. Most of the time products are used in the ways that their manufacturers intended, but not always. For example, producers of vinyl record albums assumed that their products would be simply listened to and did not intend their products to be “scratched” to *make* music (rap). Likewise, Diet Coke may make an excellent beverage, but it is also claimed to remove rust efficiently as well (indeed, there are volumes out there on cleaning tips where common household items are used in ways their designers never imagined).

But when we say that popular culture is “what we do” with the products, part of what we do with them is make meaning. Meaning is not inherent in a text, but has to be produced. Much of the time the audience will all make roughly the same meaning of a text, and that meaning will be roughly what the producers meant that text to be, but not always. It is always possible to “read” a cultural text in a very different, even oppositional, way. Fiske (1989, p. 25) provides the following example:

Young urban Aborigines in Australia watching old Westerns on Saturday-morning television ally themselves with the Indians, cheer them on as they attack the wagon train or homestead, killing the white men and carrying off the white women: they also identify with Arnold, the eternal black child in a white paternalist family in *Diff'rent Strokes* – constructing allegiances among American blackness, American Indianness, and Australian Aboriginality that enable them to make their sense out of their experience of being nonwhite in a white society.

We can think of this resistant reading as the creative challenge Williams posits as part of the ordinary processes of culture. This does not mean that one can read anything into anything or make anything mean whatever you wish it to (as Humpty Dumpty once said to Alice). Popular culture is always both the dominant uses and meanings and at least the potential for alternative uses and readings. Popular culture is, therefore, a site of ideological struggle more generally and personal struggle as one searches for one’s place in family, tradition, and society at large. Popular culture becomes a way of bending the meanings of mass culture and everyday life to help oneself on one’s way. Fiske borrows a term from French sociologist Michel de Certeau (1984) and writes that popular culture is “the art of making do,” which looks

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at acts of cultural resistance and containment. Often this resistance is not that of one who wishes to bring down the entire system, but the resistance of one who wishes to make it through a space controlled by others (school, work, the streets, home) in a way that makes life bearable and which maintains one's identity as much as possible. The aboriginal youths mentioned in the example above do not change the films they watch, or the dominant economic system that produced them, but they draw from the films a moment of resistance and identity. In the end, however, the Indians are defeated and the youths are counted as just more audience members contributing to a ratings share for a broadcast company. Do these acts of popular resistance make a difference? They do to the youths who perform them.

Now it is time to meet some of our other conceptual companions.

Territory

If culture is a whole way of life, how do we negotiate and make our way through that life? I want to borrow (and transform) a term from the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu in order to give us the means to answer this question. The term is *habitus*, which Bourdieu (1990) defines as the "feel for the game" that one has, the game being everyday life at a particular place and time. Habitus is the set of things that you do to cope with life and with other people, to make it in your own culture or to deal with other cultures when you encounter them. We could consider habitus as a sort of style that one has, and we can mean this both literally as what you wear (to fit in, or not; to identify oneself with a group, or not) and more broadly as how you act (what language you use, what distance you keep). Habitus is the set of styles that we have developed to help us move in and out of groups of people, different spaces (home, work, school, street, mall), and different life worlds. I should note that habitus is not just a set of personally learned habits, but, as James Lull (1995, p. 69) has defined it, "a system of socially learned cultural predispositions and activities," that is, a set of social strategies that one learns (and then adopts and adapts). I introduce this term first because I want to plant the image of a person moving through a social space (public or private) before I start talking about territory and territorialization.

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Territory is perhaps, along with culture, the key term in this book. Cultural globalization needs to be understood, I argue, through a theory of culture, territory, and identity. I have a fairly specific meaning for territory that I will be using here. A territory is an area of influence that one has. Everyone marks a territory. Dogs and birds mark territory and nations mark territory. Territory is that area in which you have power and influence. Both individuals and groups have territories. Your territory is your space, your turf. In your territory, particular social rules apply (Lull, 1995), and you act differently. For example, a teacher in front of a class may mark their territory by dressing a certain way, arranging the furniture in a certain way, and they behave in a certain way (facing the room, for example) that gives them control of that space. Within a classroom, specific social rules apply (raise your hand and be recognized before speaking, take notes of what is said, pay attention), and the particular teacher may add more rules (no cell phones in class, sit in straight lines).

When we walk through different neighborhoods we encounter other territories, groups of people who mark their space in particular ways: the music changes, people interact differently, the street and shop signs may even switch languages, and so on. Gangs mark territory by means of graffiti. Someone who is playing music connects with others who like that music. As topics of conversation change, groups of interest form and break up (for example, if I begin to ramble on about a particular television show, I will suddenly interest one part of the audience but bore another, who will tune out). There are also smoking territories, usually just outside the entrances to buildings, in which communities are formed, and space marked, by the practice of lighting up.

Identity

Each territory draws on a culture, but is not completely representative of that culture. There is a general culture of smokers (created by the dual forces of social stigma and coolness factor), but each group (outside a classroom building, next to the bus stop, outside the expensive restaurant) will have different dynamics. Likewise, consider

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the example of an exchange student from Russia studying in the US. That student's room may draw on elements of Russian culture to territorialize, to say something about who they are. But this does not mean that this particular space is representative of all of Russia or that this individual's tastes, interpretations, and behaviors could be seen as somehow purely Russian. Each territory may draw on elements from diverse cultures and inflect them in a particular way. Those cultural elements used to mark territory (and identity), are also those that make it possible to move through and live in society (in other words, they are your habitus).

Territories are more or less ephemeral. They have to be continually maintained. Some territories are marked by physical impediments (style of architecture) which make them more permanent. But many others are created through symbols and habits, and these change. We can think of the range of our identity markers: the sprawl of our body, the drape of a coat, a haze of smoke, the range of sound, posters, pictures, furniture, knick-knacks, colors, pets, stuff. All these things create an expressive space. What that space expresses is me. I am constructed in the process of this expression. This is not a fully conscious and intentional process; we are not fully aware or deliberate in what we're doing. We just arrange spaces until they feel right. But this is not a rationalist view of the self because much of this process is done by habit. Some of these habits are personal (the idiosyncratic tics, repetitions, and predilections of each of us) and some are habits of culture. Personal habits are the ways I do certain things without thinking; cultural habits are the ways *we* do certain things without thinking, with the "we" referring to others in the relevant culture. It's also not voluntarist because one is always territorializing with the means at one's disposal and these vary drastically by income, location, chance, class, and so on. We often say that we want our personal spaces to express who we are, to express me. And this is true in the following regard: our identity is not only expressed but constituted by these territories. My identity does not exist prior to territorialization. What this raises is the tricky philosophical problem of deconstructing the notion that each of us has a single, coherent, stable identity, or "I." As the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze likes to say, there is no I, just the habit of saying "I." There is no self, just the continual process of territorializing to express self, to search for self.

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I want to emphasize this link between the processes of territorialization and processes of identity. Identity is part of one's own self-formation, but also the consequence of what groups and others impose on one. The concept of identity as territorialization allows us to rework cultural debates about identity. Let us quickly set out four ideas of identity to help clarify this. *Essentialist* views on identity state that groups have authentic, natural identities and characteristics, which trap them and leave them unable to change. Biology is destiny. An example of an essentialist view of identity is the argument for the biological basis for race. This view states that races are essentially and, therefore, absolutely different because of biological differences like appearance or DNA. This view has been scientifically disproved: there is no biological basis for racial difference. Indeed, there is more genetic variation within the so-called races than between them. What we call races are culturally constructed categories that vary tremendously from place to place. Different cultures will split the population up in different ways. Black, for example, refers to different groups of people in the US, UK, and South Africa. In the US, at the turn of the previous century, the Irish were not considered "white." An essentialist territorialization would see particular ways of living, particular spaces and habits, as being determined by your essential characteristics (race, gender, and so on). Your "true self" is your genetic heritage.

The next position, then, is the *antiessentialist* position which argues that there are *no* biological bases for identity. For example, just because two individuals are both biologically female does not mean that both will necessarily share the same traits, thoughts, abilities, attitudes, interests, and so on. Therefore, one cannot make blanket universal statements like "All Asians are . . ." or "All women are . . ." Now, this view vehemently does *not* argue that the social and cultural categories of race, gender, and so on, are illusions. People believe in these categories and act on them, discriminating against others. The categories may be social constructions, but they have very real, indeed deadly, effects.¹ "To think of identities as interchangeable or infinitely open does violence to the historical and social constraints imposed on us by structures of exploitation and privilege. But to posit innate and immobile identities for ourselves or others confuses history with nature, and denies the possibility of change" (Lipsitz, 1994, p. 62).

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These theories are relevant here because they represent important dimensions of our lives. Immigrant populations get trapped within these essentialist frameworks that set up expectations for behavior, intelligence, criminality, and so on. It is important to struggle against essentialist views of identity – they limit the creativity and perceived abilities allowed to people. In a globalized world it is more important than ever to assert that not all men are alike, or women, or black people, or Asians, or . . . you get the idea.

However, there are times when, politically and strategically, an appeal to an essentialist identity is useful. For example, if one is struggling against patriarchy (the social domination of women by men), arguing that all women are different and have nothing in common means that it is difficult for women to find common ground on which to organize and mount a response to patriarchy. So one claims an *essential* identity *strategically* (stating that, for example, despite all our differences, we are all women). What's called *strategic essentialism* is a way of expressing an "essential identity" which isn't really essential (because we are all hybrids), but it's important to express that identity at a particular time and place (strategic) perhaps to connect with a larger group for political gain and a louder voice. For example, the African continent is quite diverse culturally, socially, politically, environmentally, ethnically, and musically. We cannot speak of "African Music" as a whole. However, if African musicians want to make their presence known on the world stage, claiming "African" identity makes one part of a much larger group than simply a national or tribal identity can. "Africans" speak with a louder voice than "Kenyans" because they are in greater numbers. There are dangers to this strategy because it plays into a Western conception that all Africans are alike. Strategic essentialism then is a political move which claims that a hybrid territory is culturally pure for strategic gain.

George Lipsitz describes a fourth strategy, what he terms *strategic antiessentialism*, which has particular relevance for our discussions in this book. Strategic antiessentialism means taking on another identity (not essential to one's self), a mask or disguise. This shows that identity is not essential since one can become (or at least appear to become) something one is not. But this practice is *strategic* because one is doing so mainly to express something about oneself which one cannot express in one's current identity. Whereas with strategic

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essentialism one focuses on and claims one aspect of one's identity, with strategic antiessentialism one claims an identity which one is not. To do this is to take on "disguises in order to express indirectly parts of their identity that might be too threatening to express directly" (Lipsitz, 1994, p. 62). A disguise is strategically chosen, "on the basis of its ability to highlight, underscore, and augment an aspect of one's identity that one can not express directly" (p. 62). Those who utilize this strategy "see how they can become 'more themselves' by appearing to be something other than themselves" (p. 63).

One example that Lipsitz uses is that of the Mardi Gras Indians in New Orleans. The Mardi Gras Indians are groups of African American men who create Native American tribal identities and fanciful Native American costumes and march and dance in Mardi Gras parades. Lipsitz writes that these groups "enact vulgar and vicious stereotypes of Native Americans that resonate more with the history of Wild West shows and Hollywood Westerns than with the actual historical experiences of Native peoples" (p. 71). The musical group The Neville Brothers is perhaps the most famous of these participants, presenting themselves as part of the Wild Tchoupitoulas and recording songs for the parades. But their assumption of these stereotypical identities has a number of strategic purposes. For example, it is illegal for Black people to wear masks in New Orleans and so by painting their faces instead they can obscure their identities while retaining a presence in the public space of the parade. Also, though stereotypical, the costumes remind the crowd of the nation's history of treatment of Native Americans (in some ways an expression of the social and economic oppression of African Americans). The performances allow these men to vent their anger at their conditions, but indirectly, in ways which are not allowed them in daily life. They also bring the Black community together while problematizing simple notions of racial identity (Black Indians). "By pretending to be something other than 'Black' for a day, the Mardi Gras Indians bring to the surface all the more powerfully their Caribbean and African ancestries" (p. 72).

Identity is always caught up in competing forces of territorialization. Territorialization is actually two processes: deterritorialization and reterritorialization. To *deterritorialize* is to erase or suppress the markers of a territory. This can come in the form of a prohibition: a sign reading "no radios on the beach" prevents any one group

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from dominating that public space via music and lyrics; school dress codes prevent the territorialization of gangs and social cliques; graffiti is painted over; and so on. It can also come from taking logos off clothes and shoes. But to deterritorialize can also mean taking oneself out of a territory. This can be understood literally as moving to another location, or experientially like when one tunes out a dull professor or listens to music on an iPod or connects with friends and relatives in other places via the Internet, text messaging, or mobile phone use.

Reterritorialization is the imposition of a territory on another a rea (already territorialized). An example could be driving through a neighborhood playing loud music in your car. The music shapes the territory of the street. To reterritorialize means to rework the cultural symbols that are in place, using them in different ways. This could be repainting the walls of the house you just purchased to reflect your own aesthetics: one paints over the old color scheme and imposes a new one.

Deterritorialization and reterritorialization are not separate processes, and each can be used to both control and resist control in social spaces. They can be seen as ways of controlling the identities possible in a space, and as ways of reinserting one's identity into a different space. But not all practices of territorialization are equal. Territorialization is always about the exercise of *power*: the power of an institution to control a space, and the power of individuals and groups to elude control (cf. de Certeau, 1984). This power is unequally distributed in society. Just because someone territorializes by tagging a wall with graffiti doesn't make them as powerful as the institution that built that wall. A relevant example of territorialization is that of English-only laws in the US, that is the insistence that English be the only language spoken in public schools. These laws can be seen as attempts to maintain a broader cultural identity by reinforcing rules of language use, tied to cultural expression. It is an example of an institution (or series of them) exercising power on immigrant communities.

There are a number of types of power. James Lull (1995), following John B. Thompson, points out that there is economic power (the one with the most gold wins), political power (the ability to influence policy and social government), coercive power (might makes right),

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and symbolic or cultural power. Note that these types of power do not necessarily coincide. Just because one has a lot of political influence doesn't necessarily make one wealthy (and vice versa). Through their influence on students, teachers can be said to have tremendous cultural power, but very little economic, political, or coercive power (especially since one cannot use corporal punishment in the classroom anymore). It is the realm of symbolic or cultural power that most interests us here, though the other forms of power will have obvious relevance. Lull (1995, p. 72) discusses cultural power this way: "[C]ultural power reflects how, in the situated realms of everyday life, individuals and groups construct and declare their cultural identities and activities and how those expressions and behaviors influence others."

Cultural power could be the power that a peer group has on your own identity, or perhaps the influence of a charismatic or trend-setting peer. Cultural power is also found in the creation of cultural products or texts (music, images, and so on) that millions use to territorialize and shape who they are. Note, anecdotally, the ways that the bored doodle drawings of children have taken on more of the aesthetic of Japanese anime in recent years (the type of line used, the shape of figures and features). As Lull writes, cultural power is also "the ability to define a situation culturally" (p. 71). As an example of this, Lull points out the cultural influence of black popular culture in the US: music, style, and influential personages (from Oprah to Michael Jordan). Hip hop as a style and rap as a musical form have given many worldwide a form through which to express their own identities (more on this later in the book). As Lipsitz (1994, p. 33) has put it, they have "established new centers of cultural power from Kingston, Jamaica to Compton, California." But just because black popular culture has some power, this does not translate into economic, political, or coercive power for African Americans in general (though it does allow a few to become quite wealthy). This is pointed out by Lipsitz: "At a time when African people have less power and fewer resources than at almost any previous time in history, African culture has emerged as the single most important subtext within world popular culture" (p. 36). For generations the cultural creativity of black culture has been used as a source of economic power for the white majority (for example the appropriation of predominantly

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black r&b into predominantly white rock and roll, or the rhythms and music of Africa being used as sources of inspiration for Western artists like Paul Simon, Malcolm McLaren, and Peter Gabriel).

The struggles apparent in our tour of cultural globalization are often struggles over cultural power, and the ability (and inability) of translating between one type of power and another (to advocate for political or economic change). If we consider identity as a territorializing move, then the ability to produce those items that get used to territorialize is an important one indeed. But we should not think of this as a direct influence and we should not think of individuals as being so passive in this process. One has the ability to choose what one uses to territorialize and also what those items will mean within their own context. Popular culture, as discussed earlier, is the case in point here.

Home

This process of shaping spaces, uses, and meanings to create and maintain identity, to create and maintain a space of comfort, is a process of making home (or home-making). I want to distinguish this process from the idea of “the home” which is more of a specific place (one’s house, apartment, room). The home that one lives in may not be a place of comfort, but the activities that one pursues to create a space of comfort within the place of the home is what I want to refer to as *home*. If we consider home to be a far away place (as do people living overseas on business who return for “home leave”; or immigrants who think of home as being another country from the one where they currently live), what we are doing is territorializing, with that longing for home as being part of the home-making process. Such processes often get overlaid with notions of nostalgia for other places and other times, but that will vary depending on the specifics of a situation. We see this sort of conflict in the earlier example from Sunaina Marr Maira and the different groups of second generation Indian young adults, some of whom develop this nostalgia for Mother India (and make it an essential part of their territory, identity, and home), and others who are quite content to be American (though may still include parts of Indian culture in their home-making processes).

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As I wrote a number of years ago on the idea of home:

Home can be a collection of objects, furniture, and so on that one carries with oneself from move to move. Home is the feeling that comes when the final objects are unpacked and arranged and the space seems complete (or even when one stares at the unpacked boxes, imagining). The markers of home, however, are not simply inanimate objects (a place with stuff), but the presence, habits, and effects of spouses, children, parents, companions. One can be at home simply in the presence of a significant other. What makes home territories different from other territories is on the one hand the living of the territory . . . and on the other their connection with identity, or rather a process of identification. . . . Homes, we feel, are ours. (Wise, 2003, p. 111)

As Svetlana Boym (1994, p. 166) has put it, when discussing a visit back to the St Petersburg apartment in which she had grown up, “it was not the space itself, not the house, but the way of inhabiting it that had made it a home . . .”

The process of home-making is a cultural one in that it is a process of meaning making, of traditions and experience. We draw on cultural meanings, habits, practices, and objects in making our spaces of comfort. In this notion of home we can see the intersection of our discussions of culture, habitus, identity, territory, power, and popular culture. We might more properly call this intersection of concepts and practices an *assemblage*. An assemblage is a heterogeneous collection of people and things (Wise, 2005). These collections of things are both structured (by families, societies, cultures, and institutions) and contingent (relying on the availability of resources, individual intention, and chance). But the assemblage is not just a person and his or her things but the relation among all these things, the qualities of these things, their meanings and ideas, habits, rhythms. The idea of assemblage incorporates as well the processes of de- and reterritorialization. In fact, assemblages are always processes – home is the process of making a space of comfort, identity is the process of searching for itself. Cultural globalization is the process of assemblage making (and unmaking).

Let me give you an example which ties together some of these threads and connects them back to the idea of identity. This is the example of Third Culture Kids (TCKs, also called Global Nomads, Expatriate

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Adolescents, and other terms). This is a personal example in that I fit the profile of a TCK. A TCK is defined as:

a person who has spent a significant part of his or her developmental years outside the parents' culture. The TCK builds relationships to all of the cultures, while not having full ownership in any. Although elements from each culture are assimilated into the TCK's life experience, the sense of belonging is in relationship to others of similar background. (Pollock and Van Reken, 1999, p. 19)

To a certain extent my own experience of growing up in a variety of countries is what inspired me to teach some of the subjects I do and to eventually write this book. The spaces I grew up in were always crossroads between the culture of my American parents and the cultures of the country where we were living. I would notice how different families in similar situations would territorialize according to different strategies. I remember walking in to houses of friends of mine from school and getting an overwhelming feeling of Americanness, or Indianness, or Britishness from the stuff in the house and the way the house was inhabited. From inside their confines the outside world didn't matter – one could be in India, Korea, the Philippines, or Milwaukee. Other houses reflected mixtures of places and cultures; some contained a myriad assortment of objects which were the traces of that family's various postings. Our houses were more of the latter. The walls always seemed relatively culturally permeable.

Moving from country to country as a child, each of these different territories made an impression on my own territorializations. But I am not a pure product of any of them. The third culture of the child in these circumstances is one created in the spaces where parent culture and local culture intersect. TCKs seem picture perfect examples of antiessentialist views of identity, and TCK identity can also be seen as an assemblage of people, places, things, languages, and so on.

The wheels fall off the wagon somewhat when we begin to look at the burgeoning literature on TCKs (e.g., Ender, 2002; Pollock and Van Reken, 1999; Smith, 1991, 1996). The problem is that in this literature the third culture tends to become an essentialized identity, but one constructed through the processes of cultural hybridity (making it more a strategic essentialism). The assumption is made that the

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experience of being a TCK gives them (us) a set of standard characteristics (frequently mobile as adults, achieving high levels of education, international focus and outlook, good with languages, good at mediating conflicts, inclined to depression, and so on). Indeed, it is an oft-cited statement of being a TCK that TCKs have more in common with other TCKs than with those in their “home” cultures. Now, I can understand this statement as a desire for affiliation, that is, since it is a pretty lonely existence (who else is constituted by these particular cultures, histories, and trajectories who can understand where one is coming from?) finding others who understand and who have similar experiences is important. This is especially true when one returns to one’s parents’ home culture, except for one it’s just a new country, not a return home. Returning “home” can prove quite alienating.

There may be superficial similarities between TCKs, but how deep do these go (Hylmo, 2002)? A desire for common identity is part of the desire for community. The desire for community allows one to evade real, deep, cultural and experiential differences (especially ones having to do with differences in power). An American child growing up in Bangladesh, a Ugandan in London, and a Peruvian in Turkey may share a type of experience, but the economic and political dimensions of their home assemblages may produce significant differences as well. TCK experience is an important one to pay attention to if we want to understand cultural globalization, but only if we keep in mind the material realities of their territorializations – TCKs encompass the elite capitalist and diplomatic class, the military, the missionary, the impoverished refugee, the aid worker, and so on.

The identity of TCKs assumed by the literature, a literature that tends to focus on examples of Americans abroad and that tends to exclude the experience of refugees and impoverished immigrant families and children, is that of a self-enclosed bubble of global consciousness, detached from the particulars of place. Sara Ahmed (1999, p. 338), in her critique of some of this literature, writes:

The very detachment from a particular home grants the nomadic subject the ability to see the world: an ability that becomes the basis for a new global identity and community. In such a narrative, identity becomes fetishized: it becomes detached from the particularity of places which allow for its formation as such.

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In my description and theorization of home above, I do not reduce home to such a detached interiorization, but see it as a process of dealing with spaces both at hand and distant. Identity in such a model is always already in process, shaped by economic and political forces, the historical realities of one's territories. We need to pay attention to TCK experience, but we must define the category and theorize that experience more carefully, with more nuance, and I think the concept of culture and territory and identity helps.

There are two more traveling companions to introduce before we move on in our journey: ideology and hegemony.

Ideology and Hegemony

Processes of making do, and of making home, occur within frameworks of assumptions known as ideologies. An ideology is a system of ideas that are taken for granted. By system of ideas, I mean that an ideology consists of the articulation of a number of ideas. For example, "freedom" by itself is not an ideology; ideology is the connection of "freedom" with other ideas (Hall, 1981, p. 31). In the West freedom is articulated to ideas of the individual (so we think of individual freedoms), but in more collectivist countries freedom is articulated to ideas of the group (so freedom is freedom for the society not the individual; a notion which seems hard to grasp in the West). These assumptions are taken for granted, almost unconscious. As British cultural studies scholar Stuart Hall has explained, whenever you hear yourself stating that something is "obvious" or "natural" or that "it's just the way things are" or "the way things should be" or when something just seems "common sense," then we are dealing with ideology. Ideology is the filter and framework through which we interpret our world. When we use ideology in this way it is not something that is wrong (one has false ideas in one's head) because that implies that there is a "right" way of viewing the world. It is also not a relativism, meaning I am not arguing that all interpretations and ways of viewing the world are inherently equal and correct. Some are wrong and some are dangerous.

We use the term *dominant ideology* to mean a system of ideas that is more widespread and accepted than other systems; usually this

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dominant system is reinforced and presented in centralized institutions (like the media, schools, courts, and laws) and represent the interests of those in power. Usually, but not always, since systems of ideas are always changing. Our assumptions about what the world means and how things should be are constantly being challenged by our own experiences in life. Those experiences may lead us to question these ideas, or they may reinforce them. But think of this: what if one could exercise cultural power so that your interests and worldview becomes the common sense of other groups? To have others accept your view of the world as common sense and natural, even if this is not in their best interests, is power indeed. We call this power *hegemony*. Hegemony is the act of consent on the part of a population to unquestioningly accept the view of the world presented by dominant institutions, even if this view works against the well-being and best interests of the population. For example, to get people to vote for tax cuts because it seems the right thing to do, even if those cuts end up defunding education and other social support institutions (like healthcare and welfare) to the detriment of those same people and their children, is hegemony. The key term of hegemony is “consent.” The consent of the population is never something that is guaranteed and fixed, it is always a struggle and always has to be reinforced and renewed.

Orientalism

Orientalism is an ideology of relevance to our project here. It is based on the assumption that there is a clear, essential, and absolute difference between the West and the East (the Orient). It is assumed that Oriental people and cultures have certain essential traits: primitive, obedient, mysterious, spiritual, wise, exotic, despotic, crafty, devious, barbaric, ancient, and so on. The construction of this assemblage of ideas about the Orient was a European invention which was both produced by and justified European colonialism (Said, 1979).² If the Orient was primitive and barbaric, then it was up to the enlightened West to civilize and tame it, and at the same time rescue and preserve the ancient knowledge and wisdom held by the great traditions of the East.

Orientalism isn't just a set of ideas, it isn't just discourse or mere ideology. This is because it was an ideology crafted and sponsored

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by particular institutions (universities, banks, companies, armies, governments) with the economic, political, and coercive power to act on it (having guns, boats, money, armies, merchant fleets, and did I say guns?). What is also important is that Orientalism isn't a rejection of the Orient but a particular appreciation of it – it sponsors the study of Eastern cultures (within the Orientalist framework) and produces knowledge about Eastern peoples, religions, traditions, and histories which is then accepted as the true knowledge of these places and peoples (this is part of its insidious nature). There is then something called *self-orientalism* where people from these cultures accept and embrace this conception of themselves (India is spiritual, China is Confucian, and so on). There is not, however, a true reverse-Orientalism (or Occidentalism) though there have been attempts to essentialize the West (not to mention the fact that by defining itself in contrast to the Orient, the West has already essentialized itself in the formulation of Orientalism). The reason for this is that Occidental thought generally lacks the power and material infrastructure to carry itself out to the extent that Orientalism has done over the past few centuries.

Any project that studies globalization must be wary of Orientalism, that is essentializing the Other. This is especially true when Westerners write with authority on non-Western matters. I'm not arguing that they (we) can't do it, but that one needs to be wary of the West once again speaking the Truth for the Orient in which the Orient itself is conspicuously silent. Orientalism is far from being ancient history. Egregious stereotypes of peoples from Africa, the Middle East, and Asia regularly cross our television and film screens. In the early 1990s Samuel Huntington predicted an upcoming clash of civilizations, a formulation that essentialized the West and the East as being absolutely different and culturally and morally opposed. The terrorist attacks of 11 September, 2001 and the ensuing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as the war on terrorism are often described in similarly absolutist terms: them and us, with "them" being primitive, barbaric "evil doers." As cultural critic Ziauddin Sardar (1999, pp. vii–viii) has put it, "the fact of Orientalism will always impede understanding between the East and the West. We need to begin again, from different premises, and find new bases for genuine encounters with the people, places, history, ideas and current existence that is to the East of the West."

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If we look at cultural globalization from the perspective of home-making, it is about how people make sense of the world and themselves in the light of a variety of competing world views and assumptions. We hear about the struggles between local cultures and global cultures (usually meaning Western, if not American, cultures). What this book aims at is that point in everyday life when both sides of this struggle come together, where the individual draws on elements from either or both in making sense of their everyday lives. This is a moment of the everyday assemblage, the everyday processes of territorialization, of gathering oneself together, of moving through spaces and places, rooms, corridors, streets. Cultural globalization is ordinary. In this process we realize that what we might consider local or traditional culture has been a hybrid culture all along, and that the global culture that it is faced with is far from uniform or universal. Both global and local cultures are assemblages of things, meanings, peoples, each with their own trajectories, movements, and qualities. It is to the global that we now turn.

Notes

- 1 Paul Gilroy (1993, p. 102) puts this caveat as follows: "identity can be understood neither as a fixed essence nor as a vague and utterly contingent construction to be reinvented by the will and whim of aesthetes, symbolists, and language gamers. . . . Whatever the radical constructionists may say, [racial identity] is lived as a coherent (if not always stable) experiential sense of self. Though it is often felt to be natural and spontaneous, it remains the outcome of practical activity: language, gesture, bodily significations, desires."
- 2 Orientalism as a term has a long history, meaning basically the study of what was considered the East by Westerners. The term achieved its current political and critical valence through the work of Edward Said (1979). His work is certainly not uncontroversial and he does have his critics (see, e.g., Sardar 1999, and Young 1990, for discussions of the controversies and issues taken with Said's work).