

**Part I**  
**The Politics of Depacification**

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# Economic Globalization and Urban Unrest

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The purpose of this chapter is to test the possible correlation between the impact of the globalization of the economy on the city, the growth of inequalities and of power conflicts, and the violence and crime which may ensue in specific segregated urban areas. Welfare and repressive policies as national tools used to manage marginal categories nationally will be the objects of the next two chapters.

The combination of the spatial dispersal of numerous economic activities and global integration contributes to a strategic role for major cities in the current phase of the world economy. A set of complex hypotheses have emphasized that these processes take place in a number of cities, “world cities” (Friedmann and Wolff, 1982; Fainstein et al., 1992; Mollenkopf and Castells, 1991; Sassen, 1991). After a time, once the growth of the nation-state had relegated cities to the back seat, it is my argument that the subsequent hollowing-out of the state led to the development of global cities. Cities are indeed influenced by macroeconomic mutations: the flows of capital and labor; the growing importance of finance; information and computerization, marking the advent of a post-industrial society; the exodus of firms to developing countries; and the expansion of categories of technicians and executives in producer services at the expense of manufacturing skilled and unskilled jobs.

At first glance, global cities seem to take advantage of the accelerated internationalization of economies. They have been defined by Sassen as command points, as key locations for the leading industries, finance, and specialized services for businesses, and as sites for innovations in those industries (1996).<sup>1</sup> But, as correctly mentioned by Sutton (1997), we lack a systematic explanation relative to the interaction of macroeconomic processes, inequalities, urban violence/crime, and the structuring of a moral order. Is there a connection between globalization, unemployment, the growth of the GNP per capita, crime, and incarceration? Do welfare policies mediate crime? How are the norms and authority negotiated to

manage marginal populations? Do inequalities have an impact on crime? Are crime and rates of imprisonment correlated?<sup>2</sup> In the first section of this chapter, my analysis relates to inequalities and spatial segregation in the “globalized cities” and to their possible correlation with violence, crime, and repression. In the second section, the novelty of the phenomenon of globalization and its impact on crime is questioned by snapshots from the past. And, in the final section, a scenario for the future linking of globalization, cities, and crime is examined.

### **Inequalities and Crime: Ecological or Behavioral Effects?**

My contextual analysis takes into account the production of new normativities enacted in places, namely cities. Two pictures synthesize what this chapter is about. In the first, the JFK, the O’Hare, or the Charles de Gaulle airports, with their complex and sophisticated machineries in terms of security. An airport is one of the most flagrant examples of a necessary and successful global place, where security is taken care of, whatever its cost and the means required. Few passengers are scared to walk into an airport, yet the flux and diversity of people and the world exchanges in this confined zone are extreme. An airport is a global actor, with a global agenda, in a local space. In the second picture, we look at nearby areas which could be East New York or Brownsville, NY, or the South Side of Chicago, or Aulnay-sous-Bois or St-Denis, north of Paris, plagued by delinquency, drugs, and daily insecurity. Those pictures are elements of global cities.

The role of places reveals the construction of spaces for power within cities and their strategic geography (Sassen, 1999). Claims made by certain actors on highly valorized spaces are encouraged in global cities by the denationalization and deregulation or privatization of such spaces which are “highjacked” by liberal projects. State and local authorities in the USA, influenced by the conservative ideology of “rolling back the state”, participate in legitimating the growth and strength of the global economy. They are agents in the implementation of global processes and emerge as altered by their participation in this implementation. The impact of a global economy is felt on the particular form of the articulation between sovereignty and territoriality which has marked the history of the modern state and its apparatus. Now a major institutional discontinuity has occurred. Sovereignty is decentered and free-trade zones operate inside the sovereign territory of the public space, as Sassen (1999) observes. The globalization of the economy has existed for a long time, but what has changed since the mid-1980s is the deregulating practice, the globalization of finances, and the growth of direct transnational investment in global cities. We may

then wonder if cities' participation in the global economy produces better conditions and collective benefits for them. In some cities, as robust as New York and Paris, it probably does. This point will be examined in Part II. The correlation between immigration and unemployment does not prove to be a drag on the economy of these regions, whereas it may in many other cities, (Lyons, Marseilles, and, possibly, Chicago) and in parts of the neighborhoods of the aforementioned cities. The same can be said for foreign investment which, on the whole, benefits suburban markets more than central cities, except in the two mentioned cities, New York and Paris, which prosper.

Yet there is a cost to prosperity. Despite the recent decline in crime rates, global cities in the USA remain problematic places for a number of people, such as suburbanites and people holding recurrent "anti-city" views (Beauregard, 1995).

It has been argued that crime and violence were indeed direct responses to the erosion of significant economic boundaries around the nation-state. In so far as the globalization of the economy has swung economic power away from nationally defined economies and has, at the same time, resulted in a local decentering, institutions have found themselves destabilized in a variety of arenas that had previously been contained.

Whether places or residents suffering unemployment or underemployment and spatial segregation are the motors of crime has divided social scientists from Engels to the School of Chicago. On the one hand, for some analysts – neo-Weberians such as Saunders (1986), Coleman on social capital (1988), Bourdieu expanding on the notion of different capitals held by individuals and on symbolic domination (1984), or Castel on the redundant worker (1996), and those debating the underclass – the economy has a reduced impact on social stratification and its consequences. On the other hand, for "global economists" (Sassen, 1991) and the analysts of regulation (Amin, 1994), the city and its social and spatial relations are molded by the economy.

Potential dangers in urban areas send us back to unequal resources, to processes supposedly open to all in a democracy but which are, in practice, extremely unequal. If, as will be shown, pauperization and segregation are less extreme in large French cities, violence remains a threat. The global city is indeed a strategic site for the enactment of politics of disadvantaged groups from below which have little power but to exert an "intimidating" presence. Under favorable circumstances, violence can become their potential mode of expression when they want to gain something, such as their share of the city or their respect as subjects (cf. the Diallo case in New York City in 1999 – see Chapter 4 – but also various protest demonstrations against police brutality in a number of countries). They introduce alternative normativity to the city. Two possible sources

may disrupt the collective space; on the one hand, as in the USA, the poor intimidate the poor, or in France, urban youth, with no prospects in life, attack institutions, civil servants, and “those who are not them” as symbols; they have nothing to lose; they act visibly, in the public space, in the same way, with the same words, and with the same rationalization used by angry farmers or public employees exasperated by the lack of response to their claims, all the more so as the global economy has passed them by; on the other hand, as in France, the middle classes, threatened by precariousness, an uncertain future for their children, and possible downsizings, also take to the streets to force the state to keep its role as regulator and as buffer against market destructions.

Since European cities are smaller in size than most of those in the USA, have experienced fewer architectural shifts, and retained many historical and cultural traditions, they seem to display more philosophical and social cohesiveness. The car seems less prominent physically and mentally, and public transport allows the interaction of diverse populations in and between peripheral areas and the centers. It should be re-emphasized here that if we are to compare European and American cities on the theme of globalization, social order, and the management of social disintegration, we need to compare American inner cities with French peripheral urban zones (except for a few cities like Marseilles) where urban disorders are concentrated.

#### *Hot spots versus violent youths: the theoretical debate*

It seems necessary at this point to bring forward the theoretical debate related to the correlation between the structural causes of inequality versus individual responsibilities which would lead to violence and crime in large cities (Hagan and Peterson, 1995: 55). Linkages between social inequality and crime have been subjected to speculation since the early days of criminology. In the USA, DuBois wrote about it as early as 1899, Merton in 1938, not to mention Shaw and McKay and the Chicago School of sociology (Merton, 1938; Shaw and McKay, 1942; DuBois, 1961).

*Criminogenic places?* The early and influential theory of Shaw and McKay (1942) on social disorganization integrated Park et al.’s ecological theory of cities (1925) by focussing on neighborhood characteristics associated with high rates of delinquency. Clifford Shaw was a former probation officer who became fascinated by the delinquents he dealt with. In a story published in 1929, he wrote about “Stanley the Ripper” as if he were himself Stanley. Life stories become a new approach in the study of delinquency. Frequently, he said, there is a big difference between the situation

as seen by others and by the individual. If people define their situation as real, it becomes real in its consequences. What is striking for current observers is that whether Shaw talks of “Stanley the Ripper” or “Jack the Roller” (whose story was published later), these delinquents are not murderers but small-time robbers in Chicago.

In *Juvenile Delinquency and Urban Areas* (1942), Shaw, now associated with McKay, states that some places are more criminogenic than others. The two authors quote, as an example, Corsica in 1825, where there was, on average, one homicide to every 2,000 residents, as opposed to one in every 37,000 in Creuse, a *département* at the center of France. They cite contagion effects, the seduction of crime, and the attraction of vice. Working on maps of delinquency in Chicago, which they analyze over time (between 1900 and 1930), they found that about 100,000 boys under the age of 17 are taken each year to juvenile courts, one-third of them for burglaries, 20 percent for larceny, and 10 percent for cart thefts.

Three structural factors – low economic status correlated with poverty, racial or ethnic heterogeneity, and residential instability – are seen as consistent predictors of delinquency. Shaw and McKay anticipated that such places could not be easily lifted out of their condition. They lack community-based social controls, and this absence contributes to crime. The same phenomena, argued Shaw and McKay, are intergenerationally transmitted in criminogenic neighborhoods, so that the spatial clustering of social problems persists in the same areas over time. This is an important finding: high rates of delinquency persist in hot spots over the years regardless of changes in immigrant and minority populations. It would, then, be less individual behaviors that explain delinquency than processes of transmission of delinquent socialization in certain areas. Instead of racially stereotyping dangerous classes, Shaw and McKay have demonstrated that black neighborhoods (there were 4 percent of blacks in Chicago in 1920) do not form a homogeneous category, nor do black young males. Variations in crime rates correspond to heterogeneous black neighborhoods. “The important fact about rates of delinquents for Negro boys,” they write, “is that they vary by type of area (as whites do)” (quoted in Sampson and Lauritsen, 1997: 334). For instance, in low-income areas with low social organization, the residents exert less control over unsupervised teenagers. The social agencies are inefficient; they are outsiders and do not understand the residents. Newcomers result in delinquency: first the Germans, then the Irish, followed by the Poles and the Italians. The transition from a rural life to the complexity of urban life adds to the teenagers’ destructurement. Delinquency can be interpreted as a mode of adaptation to confront problems of rapid mutation in a city like Chicago. But after families move to a second place of residence, the rates of delinquency generally diminish. Mobility tends to solve such problems.

Black neighborhoods with stabilized families experience lower rates of crime, Shaw and McKay conclude.

One of the best syntheses on the topic of criminogenic places has been written by criminologist Robert Sampson and sociologist W.J. Wilson (1995). Starting with the Chicago School research, they emphasize the importance of space or neighborhood effects. Crime remains attached to certain places regardless of what populations experience them. Hot spots, unsafe housing projects and streets, and interstitial zones are well known to the police; location does matter. The place stigmatizes the residents, who become ashamed to give their address as they know it will penalize them in the eyes of the police and in the search for a job, for relationships, and for any entry outside the area. According to Jargowsky, who studied thousands of ghettos and barrios, the more a poor neighborhood is surrounded by other spatial areas of poverty, the harder it will be for this neighborhood to lift itself out of poverty and associated problems (1996), a fact that is all the more true because spatial segregation is produced by global trends.

As for youth subcultures, they are competing with modes of socialization which may be less appealing or in crisis. A language, codes, tags, rites, internal hierarchies, and scripts establish a belonging, an identity, a protection against the outside environment and an enclosure. For Doreen Massey, spatiality is always and everywhere full of power, because it is constituted out of social relations (Massey, 1997: 114). Identities and spatialities are established in and through relations of dominance and subordination. She analyzes the case of English lads from a public housing estate who appropriate the public space as their own after 10 o'clock at night, in order to establish a strong identity for themselves and for the women and children whom they intimidate. Their move can be interpreted as a resistance to spatial entrapment, as the expression of young males' dissenting voices – what I call the return of the warriors fighting over honor and respect – within a homogeneous community. Such elements interact with all the variables already being taken into account. The neighborhood must be seen as a unit, submitted, reacting, resisting, or yielding to both internal and external forces.

A further line of approach is offered by Jeffrey Fagan and Deanna Wilkinson, who are currently engaged in research to reconstruct the stages and the transactions surrounding firearms incidents among inner-city adolescent males (16–24-year-olds) in East New York, Brooklyn, and the South Bronx, neighborhoods that were submitted to an epidemic of gun fights between 1985 and 1992.<sup>3</sup> They listen to the youths' narratives at length, including those just out of jail or in hospital emergency rooms, and they try to understand their “scripted” behaviors<sup>4</sup> sustaining violence and the context of “situated transactions” in which disputes are settled with

or without guns, with shots or not (Fagan and Wilkinson, 1998). Among other factors, they analyze the importance of bystanders, of drinking, and of drugs. As in the life stories told by Clifford Shaw, and as confirmed by the French field work, patterns and functions of adolescent violence emerge: achieving and maintaining status, “respect,” and identity; acquiring material goods as a source of status; exerting coercion, domination, and power; experiencing pleasure; managing conflict; expressing an oppositional culture, etc. Fagan and Wilkinson point out that their approach also requires an analysis of events, of “the person-event,” and “person-place,” and “person-context” interactions that shape the outcome of events.

*Delinquents with criminal careers?* Other experts choose to emphasize the impact of social marginalization on urban disorders. Marginalization or social exclusion are elusive concepts, as shown in Silver’s analysis (1993). In the 1970s, Carol Stack’s ethnographic research revealed that people in ghettoized areas were bifocal subjects. They knew exactly how the other half lived, but to survive daily in their environment, they had to stretch their values and develop a schizoid approach. In this way, “marginal” populations are highly integrated, as Stack pointed out (1975). Their disintegration is seen as problematic only from outsiders’ norms and their diversity and plurality are ignored. The design of their integration is always formulated by political leaders who require from them change and who design utopian schemes with this aim. But when they fail to adapt accordingly, the dominated are harshly judged. In the words of one French mayor, “you could put ‘these’ people on the Champs Elysées, and they would manage to make a mess out of it.”<sup>5</sup>

In the USA, crime is perceived as a problem of young, disadvantaged, jobless, minority males. “While inequality promotes violence, racial inequalities are especially productive of violence because of feelings of resentment,” observes criminologist John Hagan (Hagan and Peterson, 1995: 22), an observation also recurrent in France. The disastrous consequences of isolation, racial discrimination, and the concentration of jobless individuals and of gangs of teenagers in specific neighborhoods can foster a subculture of violence leading in some cases to criminal careers (Fagan, 1997). While public concern with crime and racial outbursts is primarily focussed on African-Americans and slum areas, other groups seem to catch up. Hispanics – another fuzzy concept – figure prominently in the youth gang literature and their subculture of violence is among the more popular explanations of gang membership. While this is not necessarily correlated, they constituted the fastest growing minority group in prison from 1980 to 1993. Because of extremely high unemployment rates, depressing poverty, and disheartening living and social conditions of the people living in

Chinatowns, Asian youth gangs also cumulate high crime rates and acts of destruction (Marshall, 1997: 15; Mann, 1993: 97).

According to the theory of relative deprivation, cities and neighborhoods in which high- and low-income communities live in close proximity experience high crime rates. This is precisely the configuration of global cities. "The concentration of wealth and poverty in the same geographical area is more exacerbated in the American city," Sullivan observes, "and it constitutes the precondition of street crime in the city" (1991). Seeing the wealth and possessions of the neighboring communities, the delinquents could be motivated to commit crimes because of emotional frustration, latent animosities, and lack of opportunities (Sampson, 1985: 8; Brantingham and Brantingham, 1980). According to one sociologist, who studies Chicago neighborhoods, the proximity of poor and wealthy families may account for 56 percent of the variance in homicide rates and almost 40 percent of the variance in robbery and assault rates (Block, 1997: 52–5). But if low status youths living in high status areas are likely to commit more crimes than those living segregated in poor areas, does not this seem to justify practices of segregation and a rationalization for gated communities?

#### *Outside forces?*

Writing about France, Irving Jackson makes a connection between places with a high number of foreign immigrants, their high rates of unemployment, and crime:

For the *étrangers* population nationally, the rate of unemployment in 1990 was over 19.5%. Those who took French citizenship – 3% of the population – had a slightly lower rate of 14.3%. France's overall unemployment rate of 11% underscored the unemployment problem of the North African groups, especially where their population was the greatest . . . Overall, it is apparent, then, that official crime rates in France are the highest in those *départements* with the largest official counts of *étrangers* . . . it does help to explain French perceptions of trouble in those locations with the largest minority populations. (Irving Jackson, 1997: 137, 139)

She then draws a parallel with US transitional areas in which poor, unemployed minorities and immigrants have been found to have the highest crime rates, "not only because their social disorganization destabilizes conventional normative structures, allowing deviant norms to prevail, but also because those outside of these areas recognize that these are places where residents are less likely to initiate contact with the police to report drug sales or other criminal behavior" (1997: 140). Is there a correlation between minorities, localities, unemployment, and crime?

According to conventional representations, at the individual level unemployment opens a potential pathway to a criminal career; at the collective level, it allows institutions to create meaningful, status-loaded categories which resonate with police officers, welfare workers, judges, etc. sorting out deviants and shaping the moral order. Criminals and victims are often the same people, exchanging roles from situation to situation.

Yet theories that link polarized cities and crime in relation to unemployment are inconclusive at this point and far too deterministic. "The same problems that plague time series analyses of wages, interest rates, and unemployment plague time series analyses of crime," Freeman observes. "Differences in years covered or in the model chosen or in the particular measures used affect results substantively. The safest conclusion is that the time series are not a robust way to determine the job market-crime link" (1995: ch. 8, p. 10). The 1960s were affluent, yet crime was rising in US cities. The events of May 1968 erupted at a time of high consumption in French cities. At the end of the twentieth century, juvenile delinquency rates remain high in prosperous Denmark, whereas Spain, with a 20 percent rate of unemployment, has a low crime rate. Other factors, such as the proliferation of weapons, social integration/stigmatization of socially excluded categories, societal responses to households' hardships, institutional priorities in terms of prevention and repression, and the acquiescence of their clientele, have to be included in the analysis.

The connection between business cycles, polarization, and urban threats (violence and crime) thus remains a riddle for social scientists. Another question related to economic inequalities is whether cities were more threatening in the past for those who lived there and for the authorities in charge of them?

### **Lessons from the Past**

Descriptions of social and economic inequalities in New York, by Edgar Allan Poe in 1844, by Jacob Riis in *How the Other Half Lives* (1885), and by Charles Dickens in *American Notes* (1842), could be used here. All three opposed the wealth and control of the dominant "half" to the pauperization and deprivation of the rest. The poor experienced probably much worse living conditions than today, as shown by their life span and mortality rates. They had fewer rights than now and risk was part of their daily life. Yet we also intuitively grasp that the worlds of the rich and the poor and of the intermediate categories, in pre-Haussmannian Paris, for instance (i.e. before the mid-nineteenth century), were more intertwined than we might suppose, even in terms of economic relationships. Comparative analysis of the issue of inequality and crime is made difficult

by the scarcity of historical studies on ethnic and racial crime patterns and by the lack of consistent official data or even coherent newspaper reporting.

Were cities more dangerous in the past for their residents? According to Ted Gurr, who surveyed a large body of research, current high rates of homicide and of other criminal violence are a relatively recent phenomenon, especially if compared with an idealized view of the past. However, he remarks that our “medieval ancestors had few inhibitions against clubbing and knifing their neighbors during angry brawls” (Gurr, 1989: 11). In the fourteenth century, they killed one another at rates at least ten times higher than those in Britain today and twice that of the USA today. The decline in violence is due to the civilizing influence of humanitarian values, according to the well-known thesis of Norbert Elias (1965), and to the stabilization of the frontier in the USA – American urban violence decreased at the end of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century, according to historian Roger Lane (1997).

For his part, historian Eric Monnoken (1995: 102), examining New York City homicides between 1800 and 1874, claims that in those days guns were rare. As now in emerging countries, death was also accepted as an ordinary part of physical violence amongst men. Coroners’ juries would play a major role in determining whether a death was natural or not. Consequently, the cause of death of a man hit in a bar could as easily be referred to as a fall to the floor or a weak heart rather than homicide.<sup>6</sup>

The serious historical study of crime is less than a generation old, according to Lane (1997). To what factors can we attribute a seeming lack of interest in the study of crime in New York City, an atypical, but the major city of the USA (Hawkins, 1995: 36)? The paucity of studies on crime in white national and ethnic groups and a tendency to downplay differences may have been affected by an ideological resistance to eugenicists and anti-immigrant groups at the turn of the century. This tendency was counterbalanced in subsequent decades by preconceived assumptions of the relationship between crime and non-white races, also linked with the production of official data on the white/black dichotomy, rather than on differences between all kinds of groups, including gender, age, and locality.

#### *A snapshot of historical New York*

Luc Sante has attempted to recreate the conditions of life of the dispossessed in the city at the end of the nineteenth century, with its eternal repetition of poverty, low life, and carnival traffic (Sante, 1992: xiv). The city’s

“unconscious,” he says, is the repository of the repressed history of bribery and corruption, misery, crime and despair, chaos and vice. For his part, he emphasizes the continuities. The city today is like it was a century ago; what has changed it is more technology and higher costs. I will come back to this point.

Among Sante’s findings is the extreme importance of the social diversity within neighborhoods which led to a complex economy of games. Janet Abu-Lughod, in her comparison of three cities, has pointed to the special distributions of racial and ethnic groups in New York as being chequered, and to the existence of “intervening” ethnic and racial groupings, making the city less subject to neat polarization. Wheeling and dealing, pay-offs, and Tammany Hall politics may all have played some role in keeping New York from massive civil strife, and at least damping down the fire. The major riots which mark the city’s past were not, indeed, revolts of the underclass. The riots of the anti-abolitionists in 1834, of the Astor Place Theater in 1849, of the draft in 1863, or of Tompkins Square in 1874 were all uprisings due to tensions running high between ethnic groups, Catholics and Protestants, the Irish and the blacks (Sante, 1992: 18, 201). Race riots began in the 1870s and culminated in 1901, all the way down to the Harlem riots of 1936 and 1943 (Abu-Lughod, 1995: 188).

Frequent clashes were initiated by poorer gangs fighting for days on end over turf boundaries with every weapon then available; they were sometimes repressed by the National Guard. What comes to mind here is, first, the prevalence of collective violence over individual crime, at least as told by historians, although “contract jobs” were also a business for specialized gangsters; and, second, the connection between poor populations and Tammany Hall and between the political machines and the police, as shown by this description after a battle involving a hundred gangsters at Five Pointers in 1903:

Tammany politicians intervened and forced the gangs to accept a truce . . . under the eye of the prominent fixer Tom Foley at a meeting held . . . at the Palm Café. The strip of turf between the Pelham Café on Pell Street and the Bowery sidewalk was deemed neutral. A grand racket was held and the gangsters danced with each other’s girls. (Sante, 1992: 223)

It sounds like an act in *West Side Story*. Could it happen today?

As for the police, there was a time when the entire criminal justice system in New York City was embodied in one person, the “schout fiscal” who served as sheriff to the 270 Dutch settlers in 1625, performing a range of functions, including maintaining order, keeping the peace, enforcing the laws passed for the common good of all, arresting, and prosecuting.

The District Attorney's Office was created in 1818, jails in 1830, the police force in 1844, and specialized courts in 1838. At the turn of the twentieth century, the police were often squeezed between the various power structures and the protection of one part of the population was carried out at the expense of another. As today, the meaning of laws shifted then according to whoever was in a position to interpret them, and also according to moral panics. The police were go-betweens, halfway between the gangsters and the politicians, frequently serving as interpreters between the two. They were expected to be pure in a system that was corrupt, and were certainly underpaid. They would also often choose corruption, according to historical accounts (Chevigny, 1995; Muir, 1977: 271–2). On foot or on horseback, the duty of those on patrol was principally to keep a mental file of the population on their beat (as the maps of today's police); to be aware of whorehouses and gambling houses, of unlocked homes, and to watch out for potential mob riots. They were instructed to use their nightsticks, not on the head, but over the arms and legs of the "enemies of society," that is, thieves, crooks, street peddlers, hoboes, "non-criminals who did not speak English," and blacks (Sante 1992: 243, 250).

Issues of ethnic differences in crime and punishment emerged with the immigration of Europeans to America during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Monnoken (1995) compares crime rates and punishment of African-Americans with those of specific nationality groups and finds that New York City experienced a relatively high rate of fatal intergroup aggression between 1831 and 1874 (1,560 murders). African-Americans, who represented only 2 percent of the population, were not significantly more likely than recently arrived white immigrants to be involved in such violence, although, because of their colour, they experienced more bias and discrimination. They were responsible for, respectively, 23 and 27 murders of white and black victims, out of a total of 1,482 murders in the city. In a smaller sample of 300 killers, they were outnumbered by the 95 Irish who were responsible for 83 percent of murders amongst their own, and the 39 Germans who were responsible for 56 percent of the murders amongst their own. These statistics reveal ethnic clustering. Given our current perceptions of black criminality, this study is particularly interesting. Monnoken also adds that immigrants who had arrived in the USA in childhood were more violent than those who arrived as adults (1995: 18). For historians, native-born Americans were more delinquent, once age and locality were taken into account (Sutherland, 1934: 113; Sellin, 1938: 74–107).

In brief, New York was a violent city, even if not as violent as today, because of firearms. African-Americans lived in a dangerous city, where the main danger came from other groups. It has been suggested that the

police were used by dominant ethnic groups to target minorities with utmost discretion in arrests, in order to reduce the “threat” of inter-ethnic economic competition. This point brings us back to the distribution of jobs, to market inequalities, and to the patterns of crime, urban unrest, and social control that I mentioned earlier, and to which I will come back later. I will not develop here the themes of Rothman’s pioneering history of the deviancy control system (1980), but I will simply reaffirm the increasing involvement of the state at the time in the business of categorizing, setting apart deviant, recalcitrant, and dependent groups, punishing and sending them into overcrowded, corrupt, and certainly not rehabilitative, custodial institutions. When Cohen writes that “not just the prison but the crime system as a whole is part of the larger rationalization of social relations in nascent capitalism” and that “a new technology of repression emerges to legitimate and strengthen ruling-class control of the work-force and to deal with various redundant, superfluous, and marginal populations” (Cohen, 1985: 23), we may wonder what is new.

One of the important differences that can be noticed between the past and now comes from the linkage – or its absence – between the institutional system and the populations at risk. We have seen that at the turn of the twentieth century, immigrant populations and the police force were connected to political machines. Even gangsters worked for them. There was a time during the Progressive Era, between 1880 and 1920, as brilliantly shown by David Rothman (1980), when new and powerful portrayals and representations of crime and responses to crime emerged. Reforms provided an articulation of a cultural imagery based on popular and plausible portrayals of crime and the techniques of social control and rehabilitation which expressed the conscience of elites and their sense of accommodation. Unlike what is occurring now, there was no divorce between representations of crime and the techniques of social control.

Three types of representation prevailed during the Progressive Era, as Simon and Feeley point out (1994). The first, formulated by Park et al. (1925) and by Shaw and McKay (1942), the early sociologists of the School of Chicago in the 1920s, associated criminogenic neighborhoods or delinquency areas with immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe. In the slums, the environment was seen as shaped by pathological forces imported in part from these areas. But this problem of delinquency was seen as only temporary and could be solved with adequate programs, according to the Chicago School sociologists. The bad news all related to the immigrant slums. The good news was that the rest of American society was strong, prosperous, and stable enough to meet the challenges (Rothman, 1980: 52).

The second form of representation, also developed by Shaw and McKay (1942), related to the offender with a specific developmental history

leading to deviance and law-breaking. Popular acceptance of this notion facilitated the development of new programs and helped gain popular support for them. This offender, after appropriate treatment, would be rehabilitated and would join the mainstream.

The last representation had to do with “born criminals.” The eugenic concerns of the time about the racial make-up of the USA as a result of immigration justified life imprisonment as a way of preventing the reproduction of a possible criminal class (Simon and Feeley, 1994).

All these diagnoses offered solutions: the individual was seen as educatable, treatable, or at times incurable. The suggested reforms were based on case-analysis and ethnographic research. This basis of information was critical in winning support from the influential class of college-educated journalists and professionals who shaped public opinion. These methods and analyses had great cultural resonance for the new professional managers who were beginning to emerge as power-holders in American institutions. The success of Progressive penology was that it shaped public discourse about crime, and shaped crime policy, as well. The problems of the working-class neighborhoods were heard, people had a sense of entitlement to solutions to their problems from the government, a *modus vivendi* between liberal thinkers, decision-makers, and the various classes could be accomplished via an “imagined community.” This linkage is what seems to have disappeared. There is a chasm today between professionals and academics and their knowledge, on the one hand, and politicians, the media, and the public on the other.

*What about Paris? Was it a more dangerous city in the past?*

Nineteenth-century Paris was by no means just a quiet and beautiful city. Like New York, it was immersed in globalization, trade, sophisticated services, imports and exports, and the flux of migration. The main issues that were discussed at the time were prosperity and extreme poverty, violence and insecurity. Those topics were nothing but the continuation of a century of popular uneasiness and political and social unrest, the consequences of what would later be called “Paris’s urban pathology.”

Throughout the nineteenth century, Paris absorbed a continuous supply of migrants from the provinces and from adjacent countries, and the city was unfortunately unable to adapt to this massive influx of people, who were in search of a better way of life (that is to say, mainly housing and work). The living conditions were disastrous for the poor and kept deteriorating as people arrived, especially after Haussmann’s big renovation works in the 1860s which precipitated the revolt of the lower classes during the Paris Commune of 1871. Paris’s poor neighborhoods rapidly became overcrowded, dark, unhealthy, filled with unemployed and

homeless people, and characterized by a growing number of clashes within the working class, mainly due to social inequalities and racial differences.

Many writers have documented the misery and despair that brought crime to the city in the nineteenth century. Literary quotations confirm the necessity for the poor to steal, beg, prostitute, or commit murder to survive. Those quotations, from both the century's beginning and its end, show that the situation did not change in a hundred years. George Sand, in 1827, was among the first French authors to expose the link between poverty and crime: "There are more poor people on the street. You have forbidden them to beg on the outside, and the resourceless man begs at night, a knife in the hand" (quoted in Chevalier, 1984: 122). Proudhon, in 1851, even connected crime with the desperate economic condition of the working class:

When the hand worker has been abated by work, engines, ignoring instructions, bitty division of work, when he has been discouraged by his salary, depressed by unemployment, starved by monopole, when he has no more bread, nor pie, no more money, no more stitch, nor fire, nor place, then he begs, he thives, he cheats, he steals, he kills. (quoted in Chevalier, 1984: 445)

Crime, then, represented the problems facing a worker during his career, bringing them to their most simple and dramatic expression.

It is since those days that the working class has often been considered as the "dangerous class." This opposition of the dominant class and the "dangerous" pauperized one (which represented one-third of Paris's population) grew throughout the nineteenth century. For the intellectuals and the elite of the time, who were mostly locked up in their ivory towers, blind to the difficult urban situation of the other classes, the lower class was a distinct part of society. Trying to overcome their miserable conditions, those "marginal people" were perceived as fomenting revolts. The elite clung to the traditional view that crime was intimately connected to the working class (Marchand, 1993: 66). But this would be much too simple an explanation for Paris's social unrest.

There was also racial antagonism within the working class itself. The "good Parisian workers" would reject the nasty *provinciaux*, who came to Paris to steal job opportunities from them. The question of separating and categorizing the established and the newcomers within the working class grew and developed throughout the century. In each case, animosity went both ways.

These are the main characteristics of the frequent outbursts of violence in nineteenth-century Paris. The working classes (and especially the

“strangers”) were considered by the bourgeoisie to be wild, barbarians, and nomads – all words that expressed the truly racial aspect of social unrest in the city.<sup>7</sup> On the one hand, there were the rich and the poor, and on the other, there were Parisians and the “strangers” (those who were not born there, didn’t live or get married in the same way, who didn’t have the same jobs, or live on the same street, or whose lodgings were not equally oriented towards the sun or the clean air of the Seine – those that police records, diverse descriptions, and demographic studies depicted as a “racially different” population).

The opposition of classes in the nineteenth century was not only a social matter. It was also expressed by a geographical cleavage in the city: roughly a right bank/left bank separation. Throughout the repeated urban renovation and reconstruction of the city, the poor concentrated in the center and on the left side of the river. The dominant class moved in a north/west direction, in isolated wealthy areas, among them the famous “New Athens.” The gathering of poor populations around City Hall (Hôtel de Ville) and the open market (Les Halles) that was noticed in the 1820s continued after the 1840s. At the end of the century, the poorest and the most “problematic” part of the population concentrated in very specific places (mostly in the southern and eastern parts of the city): the Hôtel de Ville, the Cité, the Île St-Louis, Porte St-Denis, and the twelfth arrondissement. In the 1840s there was such a geographical dissymmetry in Paris that people said there was a rich western half and a poor eastern one. This separation lasted throughout the second half of the century.

Hausmann’s famous reorganization of the city did much to isolate the left bank once more. But Paris’s main heritage from the Hausmann renovations was the creation of a real *banlieue*, peripheric sites where, from the Second Empire (1850–70) onwards, the workers were sent in successive waves. These were the places where poor citizens, used to urban life, were “exiled.”

It is not surprising, then, that the main “hot spots” of Paris coincided with the places where the poorest people were gathered. These places were mainly the ones mentioned above. Studying the particularities of those hot spots, we have to consider their past. Let us take Porte St-Denis as an example of spatial continuation. In the first part of the nineteenth century, crimes were more numerous there than in most parts of the other neighborhoods. Delinquents and violent criminals lived there. They did not become criminal offenders by choice, but were driven to commit crimes by “their laziness, stupidity or misfortunes” (Chevalier, 1984: 500). The Place de Grève was known for its executions and its guillotine. It was very often the place where troubles (fights or the settling of scores) broke out. Those troubles were mainly the urban expression of conflicts

between the guilds which were becoming more and more numerous at the time.

The police in those days were not very concerned with working-class clashes. "We were following each other in groups. The police was scarcely after us," troublemakers would say (Chevalier, 1984: 698). Pity and mercy were actually the principal reactions during disturbances involving poor people: "We have been told today, that many national guards, shopkeepers or workmen were reluctant in taking arms during the troubles because, they said, they could do nothing but feel sorry for those unhappy workers driven to despair by their great poverty", Chevalier quoted the people of Paris as saying (1984: 438). The police dealt more with the hard-core criminals who supposedly caused harm for no apparent reason (or for their personal enrichment or interest) and the outsiders known for their sinister reputation as killers and murderers. The police had their names, their addresses, and conscientiously followed them, hoping to catch them red-handed. Other types of person sometimes prosecuted by the police were petty delinquents, known as anarchists or ruffians (the last ones known currently as *appaches*), who used to behave as if they "owned" a particular street or neighborhood.

For a long time during the nineteenth century, crime was a question of lonely, personal, brutal intent. From the 1860s onward, murderers and thieves enrolled in pseudo-gangs, obeying disciplinary rules, and creating codes of conduct. They acted in groups, in a tactical manner. The most famous gangs in those days were known as the Stranglers, the Beguilers, the Gang Charpentier, Courvoisier, and Gauthier-Perez. During the Commune of 1871, the fights between classes were frequently due to a fear of Barbarians coming to Paris to take jobs and bring their violence with them (bitterness and xenophobia towards the non-Parisians were strong even before the Dreyfus Affair). But, in the following years, violence decreased significantly and the barricade fights were replaced by noisy, but peaceful demonstrations. There was a sudden peak of violence in the 1890s, when social struggles increased again. But these were different from the political revolts of 1827, when poor people ran through the streets carrying stones in their aprons, breaking shop windows, hurting citizens in order to get a reaction to their miserable conditions. It was also less threatening for the residents and authorities than the 1830s, when people slaughtered unfortunate pale-faced passers-by, whom they suspected of disseminating disease or of poisoning fountains (killing most of them or throwing them into the Seine).

Crime at the end of the nineteenth century was similar to what Greater Paris experiences today, with organized gangs and delinquents, and hot spots where the police dare not venture for fear of being hurt or igniting further disorder. Such areas are roughly the same: St-Denis

is still a problematic place, and the north-east *banlieue* is famous for its unrest.

Such accounts denounce the tendency to evaluate the current situation of polarization in large cities with respect to a mythical past, whether in the Progressive Era in the USA or in what the French call “the thirty glorious years,” after World War II, a time of growth, social homogeneity, and welfare redistribution which took place roughly between the end of World War II and the first global oil crisis in 1973. In cities as we remember them, Mollenkopf points out, poverty was not so intensely concentrated in certain places and racial divisions were a less defining characteristic of urban ecology (1997). The quality of shared public spaces and public services was higher. Increasingly international capital cities strengthened the national base (Smith, 1997: 124). In France, an almost fully employed society provided the working class with protections it had never experienced hitherto and the whole nation was more closely knit by universal social benefits acting as a cement in the name of solidarity (Castel, 1996). Employment and welfare transfers for those on the margins of society, it was argued, mitigated the possibility of violence. Yet we may wonder if this account is not an a posteriori reconstruction?

It is after the second global oil crisis (1979) that the term (social) “exclusion” appears in France (Silver, 1993). At the beginning of the 1980s, the link between the social disorganization of peripheral zones, their economic handicaps at a time of restructuring and job losses, and their riots is established. In the USA, it is also after the second oil crisis, in a Republican-dominated era that was cutting social policies, that the term “underclass” became widely used. The urban minorities, more disempowered and disenfranchised than ever, to which it referred, had not enough clout to mobilize and protest against such a stigmatizing stereotype. Besides, who ever interviewed the underclass, an artefact constructed for political purposes? Poverty increased and became the common fate for one out of seven census tracts of the one hundred largest central cities, while racial segregation did not abate (Wilson, 1996: 14).

#### *Global political responses*

As Sutton (1997) points out, welfare and incarceration policies are used as alternatives to deal with the unemployment rates produced by erratic business cycles. In the USA, as will be seen in the next chapter, a connection can be established between the growth of unskilled male unemployment and rates of imprisonment, but not with crime. In contrast, French governmental elites multiply welfare transfers to mitigate the social disintegration of inner cities and of peripheral zones and to limit the threat of conflictual violence from such depressed neighborhoods. Yet unemploy-

ment grew in the 1980s year after year in France, as did the electoral scores of the far right. In a situation of crisis and confusion, simple answers were given to complex questions. Although serious crime rates remained limited and stable, urban violence linked to a loss of meaning and self-worth was revealed in many forms. It is difficult at this point to establish what the independent variables among these elements are and if the theoretical basis is sound. An examination of concrete cases may clarify these enigmas in Chapters 4 and 5.

### **Society, Globalization, and Crime**

A tentative theory has been elaborated by a French magistrate, Jean de Maillard, relative to globalization, society, and crime (Maillard, 1997). Let us apply this theory to our topic. In this scenario, an analogy can indeed be drawn between processes going on all over the planet between core and peripheral countries on the one hand and, on the other, between the new centralities and the new marginalities within and among cities.

In our post-industrial era, the theory goes, societies can no longer be symbolized by a pyramid, an egg, a sandglass, not even by a simple geometrical figure or by Russian dolls. The design of a multidimensional polycentric and indefinitely fragmented set, and of complex nodal points where networks intersect is more to the point. Maillard borrows the concept of “fractalization” from MIT mathematician B. Mandelbrojt. If applied to our complex society, the fractal figure is more than just a useful metaphor; it defines a model of social organization for the future which could lead us to revise our collective representations of crime. According to B. Mandelbrojt, the characteristics of a fractal figure go as follows: its parts have the same shape or structure as the whole, but on a different scale. The shape can be slightly distorted, it can be either irregular or fragmented. The structure of snowflakes or of tree branches gives the general idea: each part reproduces the whole of the snowflake or of the tree, the whole and its parts influence each other. It seems that our current societies are undergoing the same process of differentiation leading to continuous fractalization and to the same unbalance, “chaotic order,” and constant readjustment.

In a global city or large metropolitan region, differentiated financial, economic, cultural, and intellectual networks proliferate in discontinuous spaces. The question relates to their links. For some analysts, it is less and less obvious that the wealth of the rich is generated by the deprivation of the poor. The rich speculators of Wall Street do not need the poor to be rich, they are more autonomous than ever. Does Paris need French Corsica or Milan the Italian Mezzogiorno to expand? The unemployed, the elderly

poor, the single-parent families are not currently incorporated in an economy based on exploitation as in the nineteenth century, neither are they part of the architecture of global information and exchange systems. Yet other observers – and it is also my point here – contend that the power-holders need the have-nots, even more so than before. They do not need them to exploit their labor force, but to make use of their crimes which serve markets outreaching to the rich, as the cases of arson and the subsequent transformation of poor areas for the benefit of real estate interests or the drug market network demonstrate (Castells, 1998a: vol. 2, ch. 3). As remarked by Friedmann and Wolff, global cities “are luxurious, splendid cities whose very splendor obscures the poverty on which their wealth is based. The juxtaposition is not merely spatial; it is a functional relation: rich and poor define each other” (1982: 32). A set of extremely complicated relationships within poor neighborhoods functioning as retail drug, weapons, touristic, cultural, or other goods and service markets and between them and other metropolitan areas in terms of demand and supply has been observed by Sullivan (1991) and Bourgois (1992) who conducted ethnographic studies of specific distressed zones. In some areas, the traffic remains internal to the neighborhood. Much street crime simply circulates resources within poor neighborhoods. In his work on Brooklyn neighborhoods, Sullivan reports that “the implications of the redistributive aspects of crime for local social control patterns” are apparent when, despite generalized disapproval of crime by many citizens in these neighborhoods, their actual responses to crime depend on their perceptions of whether particular crimes or crime patterns are endangering them or, conversely, bringing cash and cheap merchandise into their households and neighborhoods. The community is not anomic, it produces its own rules, other rules, and other modes of organization (Sullivan, 1991: 239–41; Stack, 1975). I will come back to this point later. The same phenomenon is observed in some French housing projects where a law of silence prevails and where a few young druglords exert their law.

Yet in other neighborhoods, the enormous profits of the trade, especially the drug trade, could not be sustained without a broadly based clientele, including many working people, both white collar and blue collar. In this sense, the drug economy spans society and links these differentiated sub-neighborhoods in the frame of the global city. “Diversity weaves itself into the economy by reentering the space of the dominant economic sector as merchandise and marketing . . . the new *glocal* culture is absorptive, a continuously changing terrain that incorporates the cultural elements whenever it can” (Sassen, 1995). Gangs’ transnational involvement in heroin-trafficking, money-laundering, high-tech thievery, and other rack-

eteering activities makes them wealthy and no longer subordinated to domestic police control. "Crime theories need to incorporate the influence of global development on the nature and distribution of crime in the U.S., including in the inner cities" (Marshall, 1997: 29). France is included in this landscape. Marginalized elements in terms of income and status (women, immigrants, and minority youth) are not then residual, but tied up to the capital accumulation process; they perform specific services, create new spatial dynamics in the urban social structure and are absorbed by the machinery of the global system.

At the core of our historical memory, we had been convinced that affluence, the major condition needed to guarantee security, relied on the ability to control people and scarce goods. We had seen immigrants and minorities linked to each other via the political machines, some of them part of organized crime in the USA, then eventually incorporated in the mainstream via labor markets and conformism to the norms of social order. Discipline and surveillance systems and the social support brought by the welfare state intervened more or less into poor neighborhoods, linking all elements of society. Currently, power and control rely on the capacity to organize communication between specialized experts and, except in the case of the custodial state, the power of state intervention into the social sphere hollows out, bringing the privatization of space and other modes of organization (Zukin, 1997). According to this scenario, the opposition is no longer between law-abiding citizens and those who ignore the rules, but about the use that is made of rules. Suppose, for instance, that a South Bronx gang decides to wear jackets manufactured by a California firm inspired by inmates' uniforms. The gang appropriates these jackets and gives them a specific and opaque meaning. For its part, the firm markets the jackets all over the planet, making them as visible as possible. A competition takes place between the firm and the gang about the management of symbols and norms, their production and their use. "Competitive *angst* is built into the world city politics," Friedmann writes, "as it is constantly engaged in an equilibrating act to adjust its economy to the processes of creative destruction and the relentless competition comprised in its very essence" (1995: 23).

Similarly, a single meta-narrative cannot give an account of the processes going on in the metropolis. In the exchange networks, communities with different norms, codes, and rules bring their own separate narratives and it is the dynamics between them via crime and violence which now has to be analyzed.

Maillard's elaboration of the crime landscape of tomorrow marks a complete departure from Durkheim, who had a holistic conception of society. I will come back to this conception in my next chapter. Society can

no longer be reduced to individual behaviors and decisions. What is the social meaning of the importance given to crime and violence in our fractionalized societies?

In the decentered and interdependent set of urban areas, which are either integrated or gray or no-go areas with myriads of possible configurations, crime can no longer be seen as a marginal and peripheric phenomenon but as intrinsically internal to the process of the global city. Not only is the “two-cities” metaphor deceptively simplistic, not only can a simple dichotomy between prospering white Manhattan corporate service professionals and a “lumpentrash” in the surrounding boroughs be deceptive, but all these parts of the city are the deeply intertwined products of the same and underlying processes. Crime is not to be analyzed as the isolated actions of a so-called “underclass” but as a relationship which is not immediately visible. It is no longer crime and violence at the margins that are frightening for the working and middle classes, but crime at the center in stable/unstable spaces, in the flux of order/disorder, and inside financial and communications networks. Still, traditional forms of crime and violence remain visible – a murder, an assault, a riot – but other forms, because of their complexity, do not immediately reveal that they are part of a whole process. They are not the negative reflection of a normal side, as a binary rhetoric wants the public to believe, but the complementary sides of the economic and social functioning of the global city. The whole is in each of its parts, the golden boys and the druglords and a whole variety of individuals in between, the police high-tech maps and the criminal maps, all influencing each other in a constant readjustment.

This proposal leads to redefinitions. Deviance is what penal regimes consider it to be. It is part of an ongoing negotiation of normative boundaries and political authority. In the same manner, as the public space, the common ground, even the nation-states are being eroded under the blows of privatization and deregulation, common law is also yielding to an interstitial law allowing the delinquent to be judged by people of his/her own community, under the pressure of communitarianism. The O. J. Simpson affair, Crown Heights, and the subsequent Goetz trials reveal that groups have acquired the legitimacy to refer to their own norms and that what they have in common is less the rule of the law than a corpus of common rules processing diverging norms. The rapid development of hung juries goes in that direction as does the proliferation of mediators, that is, of private community representatives intervening as informal judges in ad hoc conflicts. Currents laws reflect norms or rules which emphasize the fractal character of the global set of networks. Other norms are internally produced, such as in walled communities or in gangs or among large corporations. If individuals or groups disagree with the norms of their community and become the minority within a minority, they can withdraw

to differentiate themselves. The existence of a common world based on a universally shared covenant is negated.

In brief, according to this scenario, crime is no longer just a visible transgression of social norms, the delinquent is no longer just a marginal individual, crime is no longer anomic, a marker between the established and the outsiders. What is being repressed is border crossing, the impact that crime may have on the status of individuals and groups in their own arenas, and the interference of the offender with those exclusive groups and spaces. The 1993 urban crime on the Long Island commuter train (when a mentally unstable young West Indian, claiming he had received no recognition in America because of his race, shot commuters at random on a Manhattan–Long Island train) is a good example of this kind of transgression, the intrusion of someone who threatened a supposedly safe space to which he did not belong. The bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993, resulting in six deaths and a thousand wounded, is another example.

The internationalization and globalization of criminality implies that U.S. citizens can no longer deal with their fears by moving, buying a gun or installing sophisticated security equipment in their homes. Keeping the borders sealed will not work. Stiffening prison sentences will not work . . . The economic deprivation/inequality theory applies not only to the U.S., but to all members of the global village. (Marshall, 1997: 30)

It is the interference with the dynamics of the fractal society (i.e. order/disorder; criminal/non-criminal networks) and destructive criminal capacities towards the superordinated networks at the core that are under high surveillance and strenuously repressed, and less the fact that people live and work in ghettoized drug zones. This is why the images of international airports next to impoverished urban zones at the beginning of this chapter and of the apparatus of security that the former deploy are relevant to our discussion. Besides, the police no longer have the power to maintain order within the marginal categories, just as the border patrols cannot seal the frontiers. They attempt to contain the criminalized poor in their no-go areas. But, as police officers themselves admit, all they do is give them a hard time. Their function is not to deal with root causes.

This scenario for the future may appear excessive: it is one out of three hypotheses that will be tested in this study. They are not mutually exclusive, but overlap according to time and space. Marx had not anticipated that poverty would be more profitable than ever, thanks to crime outside any mode of production. Crime in poor areas is a way of making a profit out of capital via consumption.<sup>8</sup> It would seem that, via crime, capitalism, less in need of an industrial labor force, is reinventing a

manner to create profit through the consumption of the poor. Crime is not the only example. Gangsta rap is another (Berman, 1997), as are the visits by tourists to Harlem, who change the city's landscape by their very presence.

In conclusion, attitudes toward inequalities have an impact on crime and violence. Localities offer spaces which are contested by various sets of actors. Disinvested places tend to breed social disruptions, but actors from below may also exert a disquieting presence. Inequalities, which have been worsened by economic globalization, play an important part in shaping policies. In French large cities, as will be seen in Chapter 5, social polarization and segregation are revealed by the growth in wealth at the top, but not by the impoverishment of the bottom. Not only are the laws of the market less brutally exerted than in American cities, but governmental welfare transfers improve the income of the least well off. As a tool of social prevention, such policies are meant to mitigate the violence which could result from social and spatial divisions increased by economic globalization. Segregation also appears less severe than in American cities, where the intensity of ethno-racial specialization is more pronounced. In European larger cities, political and cultural resources, the valorization of historical and territorial assets, and the presence of middle classes, a large proportion of whom work for the public sector, allow the rules of globalization to be kept at bay, at least temporarily (Body-Gendrot and Beauregard, 1999).

In societies where inequalities loom large, stress and crime can eventually hinder social success. This concern was largely expressed at the Davos Summit in 1997. The NATO leadership is also worried by the disenfranchisement of inner cities, which appears to threaten domestic security, "an enemy from within," and by "immigrants at our door," in San Diego or El Paso. A militarization of the police and a policization of the army are new processes to be analyzed. Will the current sophisticated and high-tech repressive tools in use always be able to bar access of the have-nots to the "theaters of accumulation," as more actors are pushed into acts of destructive violence, and at what price? And can New York and Chicago, Paris or Marseilles, after all, never experience the recent fate of LA or of Third World megalopolis? This is a central question in terms of social control.

National logics and laws and their impact on urban conditions in relation to social control will be addressed in the next chapters: are national elites confident enough that myths of success, individual rights, and free enterprise can mitigate the effects of unacceptable inequalities? Is the choice of welfare transfers a rational option to counter ineluctable globalizing processes and their social consequences, as is the case in France? Is the choice of incarceration the counterpart of the mismatch of

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unskilled categories in a post-industrial economy or a Durkheimian way for the haves to constitute a collective identity in an increasingly fragmented society?

### **Notes**

- 1 My purpose at this point is not to discuss whether or not such and such a city is a “global city” and whether the thesis of rising inequalities and socio-economic polarization holds or not. There is abundant literature on this point (Mollenkopf and Castells, 1991; Hamnett, 1996).
- 2 Imprisonment rates are defined as the proportion of inmates per 100,000 in the general population. John Sutton (1997) remarks that in cross-national comparisons, this operational definition, while comprehensive and consistent across countries, is nonetheless flawed because it aggregates demographic processes that are probably causally distinct. Imprisonment rates are the product of rates of admission determined by criminal statutes and the processing capacity of the courts on the one hand and, on the other, the average time served by inmates according to the severity of sentences and available prison capacity.
- 3 Interviews with Jeffrey Fagan, spring and fall 1998.
- 4 Cornish’s “script” focusses in detail on the step-by-step procedures of committing crimes that are learned, stored in memory, and enacted when situational clues are present (Cornish, 1994: 8, quoted in Fagan and Wilkinson, 1998).
- 5 Interview by the author, spring 1998.
- 6 Few remember that, prior to his election to the presidency, Andrew Jackson murdered one man in a gun fight and that he had tried to murder others in violent attacks. These were understood as exemplary of manly virtues.
- 7 The proletariat was seen as a race rather than as a class and the word connoted a savage way of living and dying rather than an occupational distribution or economic characteristic.
- 8 Opium bought at between \$25 and \$125 a pound in the Golden Triangle was being sold for \$100,000 in 1997 on the American market after its transformation into heroin.